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ABSTRACT 
Here we provide a data-driven network analysis of the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Portuguese 
Market under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). We do it so from the 
point of view of the Regulator, thus focusing in how different regulation instruments can be 
improved through a network abstraction and analysis of the OTC market. Such approach, we 
argue, can allow regulators to answer complex questions: Who are the players in the Portuguese 
OTC Credit Default Swps (CDS) Market, and how is it structured?  
In this paper we provide, as a starting point, the study and characterisation of the OTC CDS 
Derivatives Market. By using a multi-segment approach, we were able to build three networks 
that represent the Portuguese OTC CDS Market: (1) PT Products + PT Participants segment; 
(2) PT Products segment; and (3) PT Participants segment. The analysis of the first two 
networks showed that activity, at its scale, is very similar to the European landscape, highly 
clustered in a small number of counterparties, with the Central Counterparties (CCPs) and the 
entities of the Group of 16 (G16) assuming the leading positions while the counterparties of the 
United Kingdom have the lion share in the OTC CDS Derivatives Market. However, when we 
place the focus only on the PT Participants segment, e.g., Portuguese players active in the 
OTC CDS the CCPs are replaced by Banks and there is a clear preference for the non-domestic 
Market and non-cleared transactions. 
 
 
KEYWORDS 
EMIR; Portugal; Trade Repository; OTC Derivatives Regulation; Network analysis 
  
7 
 
RESUMO 
 
A nossa análise de rede baseada em dados do Mercado de Balcão (OTC) português ao abrigo 
do Regulamento Europeu de Infraestrutura de Mercado (EMIR) do ponto de vista do regulador, 
com enfoque em como diferentes instrumentos de regulamentação podem ser aprimorados por 
meio de uma abstração de rede e análise do Mercado OTC.  
Argumentamos que essa abordagem pode permitir que os reguladores respondam a perguntas 
complexas: quem são os participantes no Mercado OTC Credit Default Swaps (CDS) 
português e como está estruturado? 
Neste documento, fornecemos, como ponto de partida, o estudo e a caracterização do Mercado 
OTC CDS português. Recorrendo a uma abordagem multissegmento, permitiu-nos construir 
três redes que representam o Mercado OTC CDS português: (1) PT Products + PT 
Participants segment; (2) PT Products segment; e (3) PT Participants segment. A análise das 
primeiras duas redes mostrou que a atividade, à sua escala, é muito semelhante ao panorama 
europeu, altamente concentrada num pequeno número de contrapartes, em que as Contrapartes 
Centrais (CCPs) e as entidades do Grupo dos 16 (G16) assumem as posições de liderança, 
enquanto que as contrapartes do Reino Unido ocupam um lugar primordial no Mercado de 
Derivados OTC CDS. No entanto, quando o foco são as transações de contrapartes portuguesas 
em Mercados de Derivados OTC CDS (PT Participants), as CCPs são substituídas pelos 
Bancos e a preferência recai sobre os mercados não domésticos e transações sem compensação. 
 
 
 
 
PALAVRAS CHAVE 
EMIR; Portugal; Repositórios de Transações; Regulamentação Derivados OTC; Análise de 
redes  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
ID Identification 
BIS Bank of International Settlements 
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CCP Central Counterparty 
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Q&A Questions and answers 
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RTS Regulatory Technical Standard 
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UK United Kingdom 
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GLOSSARY 
Central Counterparty (CCP) A legal entity that interposes between the counterparties to the 
transaction (the buyers and the sellers) on derivative contracts (e.g. 
becomes de seller for each buyer and vice versa). 
CMVM The Portuguese Market Supervision (Comissão do Mercado de 
Valores Mobiliários), was established in 1991 as an independent 
public institution, benefiting from financial and administrative 
autonomy from the Portuguese Government, to supervise and regulate 
the Portuguese financial market, its products and market players. 
Dodd-Frank The Wall Street Reform and consumer protection act, of 21 July 2010. 
This Regulation was the answer of the US government to the financial 
crises of 2008 and bought changes to the American financial 
regulatory environment. 
EMIR  The Regulation nº 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and 
trade repositories. The Regulation is in force since 2014. 
ESMA The European Securities and Markets Authority is an independent 
European authority with the objective of improving the investor 
protection, and promote stable, orderly financial markets. 
GLEIF The Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation is a supra-national non-
profit organisation based in Switzerland. Established in 2014 by the 
Financial Stability Board its aim is to support the implementation and 
use of the Legal Entity Identifier. GLEIF is supported and overseen 
by the LEI Regulatory Oversight Committee (LEI ROC), which 
represent public authorities from around the globe. 
Group of Sixteen (G16) Group that includes the sixteen largest derivatives dealers across the 
globe: Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Crédit 
Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, 
JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Nomura, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
Société Générale, UBS, and Wells Fargo. 
Group of Twenty (G20) International forum constituted by the world’s 20 leading 
industrialised and emerging economies. 
ISIN The International Securities Identification Number is a 12 character 
alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies a financial instrument 
worldwide. It has three parts: first two letters identify the country code 
(as per ISO 3166), followed by 9 alphanumeric characters identifiers 
of the financial instrument assigned by the competent entity in each 
country. The last character is a check, which will validate the ISIN 
code.  
LEI The Legal Entity Identifier is an unique global identifier of the entities 
participating in the financial markets. The LEI is a 20 alphanumeric 
character based on ISO 17442. 
MiFID The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council 
Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of 
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the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC). The Directive was implemented in 2007. 
MiFID II The revamped version of the MiFID. The Directive complements the 
MiFIR and pertains to bring more transparency to all asset classes 
(equities, equities look alike and non-equities) in the financial markets 
(Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending 
Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU). 
MiFIR The European Regulation (Regulation (EU) nº 600/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets 
in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012) 
applicable to securities markets across the European Union aimed to 
protect the markets and its investors. The Regulation is in force since 
2014. 
Over-the-Counter (OTC)  Transactions outside an organised financial market (commonly 
known as Stock Exchanges) where the parties bilaterally agree all the 
terms of the transaction. 
Trade Repository (TR) A legal person that centrally collects and maintains the records of 
derivatives transactions. 
Counterparty    An entity that is part of a transaction. 
Clearing Members (CM) An entity that is member of a CCP and takes responsibility for the 
financial commitments of customers that clear through their firm. 
Financial Counterparty (FC) According to EMIR, are credit institutions, investment firms, 
investment funds or their management companies, institutions for 
occupational retirement provision and undertakings in insurance, 
assurance, and reinsurance established in the EU. 
National Competent Authority (NCA) (or Regulators) Organisations that have the legally delegated or 
invested authority, or power to perform a designated function, 
normally monitoring compliance with the national statutes and 
regulations. 
Non-Financial Counterparty (NFC) According to EMIR, are entities established in the EU other than a 
CCP or a FC, which includes small and medium-sized companies. 
TRACE ESMA systems that provide a single access point to the European 
NCAs to the TR data (transaction data reported to these entities in 
compliance with EMIR). 
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QUOTES 
 
All the quotes within this work are summarised (authors and year of publication). 
The reader should refer to the Section 6 of this work for the complete list of the bibliographic 
references.  
All the references in that section are ordered in alphabetical order. 
Additional footnotes within provide short and complementary information to the text. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 financial crisis resulted in a sequence of events that shook the financial system 
worldwide. Losses resulting from the crisis are estimated to top up to as much as 22 Trillion 
US Dollars (United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2013). It represented the 
collapse of the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives Market.  
One of the most well-known and reported events that unfolded during the crisis was the 
downfall of the Lehman Brothers and the consequent chain of events that followed it. At a first 
glance, those events could be seen as random. However, a closer look reveals complex web of 
interdependences between financial institutions that dictated the sequence of events, with 
Lehman at its core. The story of the 2008 financial crisis is that of the inherent systemic risk 
embedded in a complex but fragile financial system, the story of a cascade of events, and in 
particular, of the vulnerability of a system to the collapse of a few, but central, elements.   
The OTC Derivatives Markets are markets where the parties involved in each transaction 
pre-agree totally or partially all the characteristics of the financial instrument as well as the 
terms of the transactions to meet their hedging or business needs (OTC Derivative contracts) 
and cost reductions, not achievable through the standardise Regulated Market (Exchange 
derivative contracts) (McGill & Patel, 2010). In Stock Exchanges worldwide such hedging is 
not always possible as the contract characteristics are pre-defined and standardised leaving a 
very limited optionality for its participants when trading Exchange derivative contracts: price 
(except its granularity) and volume of the transactions. The flexibility and the possibility to 
create a contract that fits the hedging needs of the counterparties make the OTC Derivative 
Markets very popular amongst the major players of the financial markets worldwide (Group of 
Sixteen – G16 or major international banks). 
As a matter of example, generally in a Stock Exchange (i) all prices of the financial 
instruments are publicly disclosed and updated in real-time providing information across all 
participants; (ii) anyone with access to the market can enter into a transaction at the publicly 
available prices; (iii) the maturity date (date at which the seller delivers the underlying to the 
buyer and receives the pre-agreed amount) is a fix date defined and published by the Stock 
Exchange; (iv) once a transaction takes place in a Stock Exchange its data (price, volume, 
maturity) is publicly disclosed. On the complete opposite side, the players in the OTC Markets 
agree the prices between themselves as well as the maturity (i and iii). Moreover, prior to 
European Market and Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), no one apart from those involved in 
such agreement had access/knowledge about the price or even that the transaction has taken 
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place. Such opposite characteristics lead to the surge of several labels when referring to Stock 
Exchange Markets (SE) and OTC Markets (OTC) over the years: transparent (SE) vs dark 
(OTC), regulated (SE) vs unregulated markets (OTC), standardised (SE) vs non-standardised 
(OTC). 
The story of the OTC Derivatives Market collapse is in many ways similar to story of many 
other complex systems, and of the type of cascade events of failures that can stem from the 
collapse of a few of its elements.  Classical examples in the literature include, the risk of large 
scale blackouts from the overload of individual components (i) in power grid structures 
(Chassin & Posse, 2005); (ii) in the internet, the incorrect load balancing in the elements of its 
infrastructure can greatly impair internet traffic (Apps Team, 2012); (iii) in electronics the 
failure of individual components can result in large scale fail of the entire system (Schroeder & 
Gibson, 2005); (iv) in ecology regime shifts (e.g., the extinction of a specie) in one ecosystem 
can lead to a string of events along interdependent ecosystems (Rocha, Peterson, Bodin, & 
Levin, 2018).  
Underlying a cascade of failures in complex systems is always a well-defined network of 
interdependences along which failures will spread and scale. Hence, to truly understand the 
susceptibility of the system to the failure/collapse of a few individual elements we need to first 
understand the underlying interaction structure between its elements. In the context of financial 
markets, these ideas have already been pushed forward (Abad et al., 2016; D’Errico, Battiston, 
Peltonen, & Scheicher, 2018; Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar, & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, 
2015; Levels, van Stralen, Kroon Petrescu, & van Lelyveld, 2018) to help identify, or better 
understand, the complex patterns that emerge from events such as the 2007/2008 crisis. 
In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 crisis, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report 
(Federal Crisis Inquiry Commision, 2011) stated that there was not sufficient information 
available regarding the systemic risk of OTC Derivative Markets. Nowadays, data has been 
made available through new market-wide regulations (such as the EMIR) in Europe or the 
Dodd-Frank Act in the United States. Regulators are now empowered with the necessary data 
to more effectively develop the necessary regulatory instruments to regulate the OTC 
Derivatives Markets (Benos, Wetherilt, & Zikes, 2013). One important aspect of the newly 
available data is the level of transparency it brings to a previously opaque market, which was 
mainly due to the bilateral nature of the transactions carried out. The basis of EMIR relies on 
the willingness of the Group of Twenty (G20) to ensure more transparency to the OTC 
Derivatives Markets  
Regulators can now apply data-driven approaches to: 
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• Understand the undergoing activity on the OTC Derivatives Market; 
• Test ongoing supervision action plans; 
• Develop new regulatory instruments; and  
• Reinforce measures that promote orderly and fair markets; 
In that context, here we focus on the study of the Portuguese OTC CDS Market (see Section 
3).  While past works have focused in data from a single Trade Repository (TR), by looking at 
the OTC Derivatives Market at the European Level, and/or using EMIR data sets from before 
its revision in November 2017 (Abad et al., 2016; European Securities and Markets Authority, 
2017, 2018a). It is noteworthy to mention a study dedicated to get insight on the Irish Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) Market by exploring the EMIR state report from the DTCC before 
November 2017 (Kenny, Killeen, & Moloney, 2016), and the study dedicated to the Dutch CDS 
Market using a daily time-series data set from DTCC instead of a snapshot (transaction report 
rather than state report) (Levels et al., 2018). We believe that such studies as well as the work 
developed herewith, can be key for supervisors, market players, and policymakers EU-wide. 
To that end, in this work we use the trade reports from 2018 to explore the quality of the existing 
data, and the Steps necessary to perform a network analysis with regulatory purposes as the 
goal. In particular we approach the following questions:  
• Who are the players in the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market under EMIR? 
• What type of market players exist in the Portuguese landscape? 
• How the different market players are interconnected? 
• How is the market structured? 
• Are there any players that can represent a risk to the network (e.g. in case of failure)? 
With this work we hope not only to contribute to complement the existing studies on the 
CDS using EMIR data with more recent data sets (2018) but also to kick off the usage of a data 
science approach for better regulation. In order to achieve that we took a multi-segment 
approach that consist in the segmentation of the data sets into 3 segments all linked to the 
Portuguese OTC CDS Market: (1)  starting from a broader view where we took into 
consideration all reports where the transaction involved a Portuguese OTC CDS, and at least 
one of counterparties is Portuguese – Portuguese Product and Portuguese Participants 
segment (PT Products + PT Participants segment); (2) Portuguese Product segment (PT 
Products segment), where we looked at the reports with transactions involving a Portuguese 
OTC CDS (e.g., a product identified with a Portuguese ISIN) ; and (3) the strictest segment – 
Portuguese Participants segment (PT Participants segment), where we look only to the 
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network where at least one of the counterparties involved in the transaction in an OTC CDS is 
Portuguese.  
This working paper is organised as follows: Section 2, provides a brief overview of the 
literature focused in contextualising the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the EMIR, 
summarising past studies, and introducing the necessary network science methods to 
understand the work developed; Section 3, discusses the pre-processing of the data used in this 
work; Section 4, discusses the cleaning process as well as the network analysis of a sub asset 
class of Credit Derivatives: the Credit Default Swaps; Section 5 presents the conclusion and 
remarks also mentioning the main limitations of this work and future opportunities. 
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2. OVERVIEW 
Here we provide a brief overview to the elements necessary to understand the work 
conducted for this work, the background context, and its implications. Section 2 is divided in 
four subsections: (i) in Subsection 2.1 we introduce the background to the financial crisis of 
2007/2008 as well as the European Market and Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) that resulted 
from the crisis in an attempt to better regulate the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives Market; 
(ii) Subsection 2.2 discusses the background of EMIR, its main objectives, and participants; 
(iii) Subsection 2.3 provides a brief review of what are OTC Derivatives, including a dedicated 
section to the Credit Default Swaps, which we studied in more detail in this work; (iv) Section 
2.4, introduces the key fundamentals of network science necessary to understand and replicate 
the analysis performed later in this work, with a special focus to past applications to the study 
of financial markets. 
2.1. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2007/2008 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 policymakers, governments, and the 
Group of Twenty (G20) committed to improve transparency of derivatives markets across the 
world. However, long after the crisis, the extent of its damage continued to be based only in 
rough estimates and much is still left to uncover. The reason being the lack of transparency to 
clearly identify the existing bilateral agreements between Lehman Brothers and its 
counterparties, and consequently link losses and bankruptcies that resulted from the Lehman’s 
collapse. Due to the opacity of bilateral agreements between parties in the OTC Derivatives 
Markets, very common on the OTC landscape, some authors like (Duffie, 2012) labelled these 
“markets” as “dark markets”. 
As pointed by (Cielinska, Joseph, Shreyas, Tanner, & Vasios, 2017) opaque markets, such 
as the OTC Derivatives Market, do not share information about counterparty and network 
exposure to both the financial market players and the Regulators. 
The derivative transactions, in particular those bilaterally traded such as the OTC, were 
considered as the fuse (see Subsection 2.3 for more details) to the financial crisis, as highlighted 
by (Yellen, 2013) in her speech to the American Economic Association. As presented by Yellen, 
the OTC Derivatives proven to be an important channel for the transmission of risk during the 
financial crisis. 
In face of the crisis, the G20 members, in their 2009 statement in Pittsburgh (Leaders’ 
Statement, 2009), endorsed the draft of  new regulations to bring more transparency to the OTC 
markets and its products.  
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The mandate from the G20 members seems natural as several authors pointed the crisis and 
the need for more transparency as an important Step to the opaque Derivatives Markets and the 
OTC Derivatives in particular (Abad et al., 2016; D’Errico et al., 2018; Daron Acemoglu et al., 
2015; Levels et al., 2018). Whereas, (Garslian, 2016) in its paper reminded that the role of these 
products in the financial crisis was controversial as the convergence of opinions leaded to 
“endless debates regarding the role OTC derivatives played in that crisis and, thus, the 
necessary extent of OTC derivatives regulation.” 
2.2. THE EUROPEAN MARKET AND INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION (EMIR) 
The European Market and Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) aims at meeting the goals set 
by the Group of Tenty (G20) recommendations, and focuses in four main areas: (i) transaction 
reporting and record keeping; (ii) trading on trading venues1; (iii) central clearing; and (iv) 
margining and capital requirements hence the reduction of the systemic risk. 
EMIR brought harmonised rules across the European Union’s Member States and facilitated 
regulatory coordination, that is, coordination between regulators from different European (EU) 
Member States, integration in the international financial system, and the enforcement of the 
rules to counterparties with a cross boarder operation. As stated by (Godwin, Ramsay, & Sayes, 
2017), the OTC Derivatives are global in the general sense but also as they relate to financial 
markets hence the need to have a solution that is cross-border “both regional and global” to be 
more overarching. 
The entities under EMIR are identified and labelled consistently across Europe according 
to their type (European Comission, 2012): (i) Financial Counterparties (FC) that include 
banks, brokers, asset managers, and insurers; (ii) Non-Financial Counterparties (NFC) 
consisting mainly of corporates, (iii) Central Clearing Counterparties (CCP) and their 
Clearing Members (CM).  
New players joined the Derivatives Markets such as the Trade Repositories (TR). These 
players have the responsibility to collect and maintain the records of all Derivative transactions 
in the EU reported by the aforementioned entities, as well as to make such information available 
to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and to each of the national 
competent authority (the regulators of each EU Member State2). The Figure 1 below represents 
 
1 Stock Exchange or trading platforms. 
2 Each National Competent Authority (NCA). In Portugal the supervision of EMIR is of the responsibility of the Portuguese 
Market Supervision (CMVM), the Portuguese Central Bank (BdP) and the Funds and Insurance Association (ASF) has the 
mandate to apply, supervise and monitor the application of the EMIR to the OTC Derivatives Market and the market players 
under its supervision. On a daily basis, the NCAs access the information allowing these supervisors to monitor the compliancy 
of the Regulation. 
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the flow of data between the counterparties, the TRs, ESMA and the National Competent 
Authorities (NCAs). Each counterparty sends the reports to at least one TR (for the complete 
list please refer to Table 13 of Section 7). After data consistency validations the TR sends the 
data to ESMA, and then the latter makes the data available to each European NCA. ESMA hub 
centralises all the information in a single place, however the NCAs only have access to the data 
it concerns, and basket3 data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Authorised Trade Repositories (TR) under EMIR as of March 2019 
In the period in hands, the TRs provide data of two types: (i) the detailed data available 
through the daily transaction reports, and (ii) the aggregated data available through the state 
report. In the first 22 months of the EMIR, 27 billions of records were received by the TRs 
(European Securities and Markets Authority, 2017) and each of those records had more than 80 
fields/variables, which contained relevant information to understand the overall European 
Derivatives Markets. 
As  pointed out by (Cielinska et al., 2017) with EMIR, policymakers, regulators, and 
researchers can now observe the trading activity and the network of exposures close to its 
execution, which provides them the ability to identify the systemic risk within the financial 
system. The downsize, however, is posed by the new challenges and limitations that the mix of 
the high volume of data and its complexity brings to its potential users. 
The huge data sets on Derivatives that are now available to the European national competent 
authorities only possible due to the Regulation in force (EMIR and its related Regulatory 
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Technical Standards – RTS and Implementation Technical Standards - ITS), can be used by 
the European regulators in its supervision indicators (Ali, Vause, & Zikes, 2016). 
2.3. OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES  
Credit Derivatives are derivative assets classes. In order to understand these assets and, more 
importantly, their link to the 2007/2008 financial crisis we first need to clarify what are 
Derivatives and, in particular, what are OTC Derivatives. We start this Subsection by 
answering the question of “what is a derivative?”, and later discuss what Credit Default Swaps 
are (a sub-asset class of Credit Derivatives). 
 
2.3.1 Derivatives 
According to (Garslian, 2016), Derivatives are financial instruments that depend on an asset4 
(a share, a commodity, an interest rate, a currency, a credit, among others). Derivatives can be 
either traded in a Stock Exchange or privately between parties. The latter represents the Over-
the-Counter (OTC) Markets, which serves to transfer the financial risk between counterparties 
(Duffie, 2010). 
Derivatives have become, according to (Gofman, 2017), a major slice of the global financial 
markets pie. Their rapid growth jointly with the link to the 2007/2008 financial crisis pressured 
governments to intensify the powers of regulators over the OTC Derivatives Markets. Hence, 
the European Market and Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and its related legislation5 was 
created in Europe, sanctioned by the European Commission (EC).  
 
2.3.2 Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives 
Before EMIR, there was no pressure to impose standardisation, clearing and/or margin 
requirements to the OTC Derivatives Markets. While such requirements were well established 
for derivative products traded in the Stock Exchange (Garslian, 2016). Such specificities were 
explained in the paper of (Duffie, 2010) as a characteristic of a private negotiated contract, that 
allows counterparties to customise it to the client’s needs, e.g., the terms could be agreed one 
by one between each party involved in it.  
 
4 Also referred as an “underlying”. 
5 The Regulation has three levels: Level 1 – EMIR; Level 2 – RTS and ITS; Level 3 – Q&A (Questions and Answers), 
Guidelines. 
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In the OTC Derivatives Markets the parties involved in each transaction pre-agree totally or 
partially all the characteristics of the financial instrument as well as the terms of the transactions 
to meet their hedging or business needs or achieve cost reductions. Such efficiencies are often 
not achievable through a standardised derivative available through a Regulated Market (McGill 
& Patel, 2010). The standardisation imposed by the Regulated Markets worldwide leave a very 
limited optionality for the parties involved in a derivative transaction apart from price (except 
its granularity) and volume of the financial instrument.  
The flexibility inherent to the OTC Derivatives Markets which is well recognised by several 
authors does not exist in the Stock Exchanges where the terms of the financial instruments and 
agreements are standardised and often applied across Stock Exchanges, making the Stock 
Exchanges liquid pools, transparent, highly regulated and somewhat pricier for its participants 
(Garslian, 2016).  
Due to the flexibility that is associated to the OTC Derivatives, it does not come as a surprise 
that in 2017, according to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in its 
statistical report (European Securities and Markets Authority, 2018b), the transactions of OTC 
Derivatives kept hegemony versus the Derivatives transactions on the Stock Exchanges. 
However, there was an increase on the reporting of transactions in the Stock Exchanges. 
As mentioned above, the OTC Derivatives Markets are an historical decentralised and 
opaque market without a source of information apart from the counterparties to the transaction. 
This lack of a wider channel of information creates uncertainty among market participants 
(Coudert & Gex, 2013). 
There are a few definitions of OTC Derivatives from several authors that we read in 
preparation to this work from which, one was selected: “an OTC derivative is a privately 
negotiated contract between two counterparties to exchange future cash flows that depend on 
the performance of an underlying” (Yellen, 2013). 
Through the transfer of the acquisition of the underlying asset to a later stage in time, OTC 
Derivative products require that at least one of the counterparties performs payments in a pre-
agreed future date, which adds a key element to the transactions involving such type of 
contracts: counterparty risk. The counterparty risk linked to its globalism (cross-border 
products) has implications in the economy worldwide as pointed by (Yellen, 2013). Moreover, 
(Godwin et al., 2017) reinforced its wide scope and urged the need for regulatory coordination 
between regulators.  
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2.3.3 Credit Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps 
Credit Derivatives are products that transfer the credit risk related to a single underlying, or 
an underlying portfolio with the transfer of such underlying and without the need of the 
counterparties to own it.  
Credit Default Swaps 
Many authors suggested that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) were the root cause for the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008, but what are they? 
The sub-asset class of Credit Derivatives: CDS, is an OTC Derivative linked to credit 
(underlying asset) used to protect the buyer against loss of principal (notional) due to a certain 
entity facing a credit event (Mengle, 2007). In return for such protection, the buyer of such 
contracts has to pay to the seller a pre-determined premium/spread (Benos et al., 2013). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Credit Default Swap Flow6 
The CDS Markets, once considered as a niche, become an important market for the transfer 
of credit risk and are considered by (Oehmke & Zawadowski, 2016) as one of the most 
significant financial innovations of the last decades. 
These contracts bear a recognised credit risk that arise from the counterparties to the 
transaction as well as the underlying risk of assuming the position in the transaction (Arora, 
Gandhi, & Longstaff, 2012; Bardoscia, Bianconi, & Ferrara, 2018; Benos et al., 2013). 
Moreover, the CDS have been linked to a certain degree of opacity, which led to the financial 
crisis in 2007/2008, the failure of the Lehman Brothers, and the AEG bailout (Morrissey, 2008). 
The overall CDS market is highly concentrated in a few counterparties (Brunnermeier, 
Clerc, Gabrieli, Kern, & Memmel, 2013) with a high degree of intermediation. Major banks 
resell the credit risk to other market participants, generating a network topology characterised 
by a so-called “core-periphery” structure (Peltonen, Scheicher, & Vuillemey, 2014). Such 
 
6 Contingent payment, in case of a credit event (when a person or an organisation are unable to meet the terms of an agreement), 
the seller has to pay the pre-agreed amount. 
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specificity of the Market is the root of the systemic financial distress, that is, in case of failure 
of one of its most important participants (Duffie, 2010). 
In case of a credit event of the reference entity, the buyer can claim payment from the seller 
minus the recovery value of the underlying asset. CDS were widely used prior to the crisis 
mainly due to their liquidity compared to the underlying (Kenny et al., 2016) 
Several authors (Abad et al., 2016; Benos et al., 2013; Kenny et al., 2016) concluded that 
the CDS Derivatives Market is highly concentrated in a small group of counterparties as it was 
also observed in the snapshot presented in this paper for the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives 
market. 
Situations where high concentration exists in a few counterparties, bring, according to some 
authors (Kenny et al., 2016), uncertainty to the market and its participants, which ultimately 
leads to an increase of counterparty credit risk within the financial system. 
 
2.4. NETWORK SCIENCE 
A Network is a model made up of two independent but interrelated sets: a set of 
nodes/vertices and a set of links/edges. Nodes represent the atomic elements of the system under 
study, while links connect pairs of nodes. A network can thus be used to abstract the structure 
of many different systems, while providing a common ground for their analysis. In the study of 
social systems, nodes would correspond to individuals and the links with a social relationship 
(e.g., friendship, co-workers, collaborators, family, influence, and cooperation). The Figure 3 
shows the graphical representations of networks. 
A useful way to represent a network is through the so-called Adjacency Matrix (𝐴), whose 
entries (𝑎!") encapsulate the connectivity information between a pair of nodes (say, 𝑖 and 𝑗). 
Networks can be Undirected (𝐴 is symmetric along the diagonal) or Directed (𝐴 is not 
symmetric along the diagonal), Weighted (entries of 𝐴  are real numbers that correspond to 
either a measure of similarity or distance) or Unweighted (entries of 𝐴  are one or zero if pairs 
of nodes are, respectively, connected or not) depending on whether links are considered to carry 
information about the direction of relationships (e.g., information flows from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗, 
but not in the reverse direction), and whether the strength of relationships need to be taken into 
account (e.g., the link between nodes 𝑖	and 𝑗	is n times stronger than the relationship between 
nodes 𝑗and 𝑘). The later needs to consider that the strength, or weight, of the relationship can 
be a measure of similarity/proximity (e.g., heavier links imply that nodes are closer) or a 
measure of distance (e.g., heavier links imply that nodes are farther away). Self-links, links that 
28 
 
start and end in the same node, are often ignored in network analysis, in such case the diagonal 
of 𝐴 equals zero. In the following of this Subsection, and for the sake of simplicity, we will 
discuss descriptive methods associated to the analysis of both Undirected and Unweighted 
networks.  
 
Figure 3 – Examples of different types of Networks and its different representations. A) shows a graphical 
representation of a network with 7 nodes and 10 edges; B) the Adjacency Matrix representation of the network in 
A); C) graphical representation of a directed network; D) graphical representation of a weighted network. 
 
By abstracting the structure of a system as a network it is possible to obtain a rich set of 
descriptive metrics that offer valuable insights into its organisation and functioning  (Jackson, 
2008; Ribeiro, Pinheiro, Santos, Polónia, & Pacheco, 2018). For instance, the number of links 
node 𝑖 participates defines his degree 𝑘!. The simplest characterisation of a network is obtained 
from its degree distribution, 𝐷(𝑘), that captures the fraction of the nodes that have degree 𝑘. 
Hence, the average degree of the population is computed as: 〈𝑘〉 = 3𝐷(𝑘) 𝑘 (1) 
and the variance of the degree distribution is: 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑘) = 〈𝑘#〉 − 〈𝑘〉# (2) 
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which is often a measure of the level of heterogeneity of the network. Other descriptive 
measures include the maximum degree. 
Networks provide a natural metric to measure distances between elements in the system . 
For instance, the distance between any two elements/nodes, say 𝑖 and 𝑗, in a network can be 
thought as the minimum number of links necessary to transverse in order to draw a path that 
connects the two nodes. Hence, the shortest path 𝑑!", or distance, corresponds to the shortest 
length (measured in the number of links) from all paths between nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗. The average 
path length (𝑨𝑷𝑳) of a network measures the average shortest path, 𝑑!", between all pairs of 
nodes. The diameter of a network is the largest shortest path in the network, that is max	(𝑑!"). 
Another measure of interest in the characterisation of a network is the level of clustering, 
that is the number of triangle motifs in the network. In that sense, the average clustering 
coefficient (𝑪𝑪) measures the probability that two random nodes with a common linked third 
node are also a link between each other (D. Watts & Strogatz, 1998), and can be formally 
computed as:  𝐶𝐶 ≡ 〈𝑐〉 = 1𝑁3𝑐!$!%& (3) 
where 𝑁 represents the number of nodes in the network, and 𝑐!  is the fraction of closed triangles 
formed between a node 𝑖 and every possible pair of its nearest neighbors. 
 
Figure 4 – A) example of two paths of length two between node 1 and node 6 in a network. B) different 
clustering coefficients measured at individual level for three network different motifs. 
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Figure 5 – Examples of the different centrality measures in a network of family ties among Italian families of 
the XVIth century. Larger nodes indicate higher centrality; green nodes correspond to the two most central 
individuals according to each metric. 
Networks provide an opportunity to quantify the importance of individual elements of a 
system by their location in the network. Such measures are commonly associated with the 
centrality of nodes in the network, in that more central nodes are more important. Different 
measures of centrality try to account for different roles and systems, some of the most popular 
include: 
• Degree centrality (𝑘!) states that most central nodes are the nodes with the highest 
number of connections, and it is given by: 𝑘! =	3𝑎!"!'" , (4) 
where 𝑎!" are the entries of the adjacency matrix.   
• Closeness centrality (𝐶!) states that the most central individuals are the ones that 
minimise the geodesic distance to all the other nodes within a network, and can be 
represented as:  𝐶! =	 1𝑁 − 13 1𝑑!"!'" (5) 
where 𝑑!" is the length of the shortest path connecting 𝑖 and 𝑗. 
• Betweenness centrality (𝐵!) states that the most central nodes are the ones that lie more 
often in the pathway between many shortest paths, or in other words the node that plays 
more often the middleman role. This quantity can be formally computed as: 
BetweennessClosenessDegree
PageRankEigenvector
Medici
Strozzi
Guadagni
Ridolfi
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𝐵! =	3 𝜎(!"𝜎("!'"'( (6) 
where 𝜎(" measures the number of shortest paths that connect 𝑘 to 𝑗, and 𝜎(!" the number 
of those shortest paths that pass by 𝑖. In a network, the nodes with a high level of 
betweenness will have greater influence over the flow of information that connects 
different partitions that are weakly connected.  
• Eigenvector centrality (𝐸!) states that a node is more central if it is connected to other 
central nodes. It usually involves a recursive process that can, in general, be represented 
as a eigenvector problem of the form: 𝐸! = 1𝛾3 𝑎!"𝐸")"%&,+'! (7) 
where 𝛾 is a constant. This measure has been popularised, for instance, as an alternative 
to the Impact Factor in measuring the importance of different research journals. A popular 
example of a centrality measure that is a particular case of the Eigenvector centrality is 
the PageRank centrality (Page & Brin, 2003), which become popularly used  by Google 
to rank web pages according to their relevance in searchers. 
 
2.4.1 Models of Networks 
Past works have delved into identifying prototype network models that can result from 
different scenarios and conditions. Of these, it is noteworthy to mention the following 
examples: Complete, Regular Networks, Random Networks; Exponential Networks; and Scale-
Free Networks. 
Complete networks are structures in which each node is connected to all the other nodes in 
the network. 
Regular Networks, such as right structures or lattices, are characterised by highly symmetric 
structures in which all nodes have the same degree (number of connections). Nodes are 
connected depending on their position in an Euclidian space. 
Random Networks are often taken as the null model of network analysis. A popular 
algorithm to generate random networks is the Erdős–Rényi model which is as follows: starting 
from a 𝑁 set of unconnected nodes, for each pair of nodes a link is created connecting them 
with probability 𝑝. The choice of 𝑝 will define the connectivity of the network. For a sufficiently 
large 𝑁, the degree distribution resembles a Poisson distribution, that is 𝐷(𝑘) = 〈𝑘〉(𝑒,〈(〉𝑘! (8) 
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Exponential Networks have a degree distribution that follows an exponential distribution. 
To generate an exponential network, one can employ an algorithm of growth with a linear 
attachment, for instance: starting from a core of 3 nodes, iteratively add a new node that 
connects to two pre-existing nodes at random. This process is repeated until the desired network 
size is achieved. In the limit of large 𝑁, the degree distribution follows 𝐷(𝑘) = 𝜆𝑒/( (9) 
Scale-Free Networks have been widely popularised the late 90s and early 2000’s when many 
real-world system networks were thought to follow this particular structure. Scale-free 
networks are characterised by a fat tailed degree distribution, indicating that a few nodes 
accumulated many connections, while the vast majority of the nodes only have a few. An 
algorithm often used to generate Scale-Free networks is the Barabási-Albert algorithm of 
growth and preferential attachment, which works as follows: starting from a core of m nodes, 
iteratively add a new node that connects to m-1 pre-existing nodes.  𝐷(𝑘) ≈ 𝑘,0 (10) 
 
Figure 6 – Examples of the different popular network models in the Network Science literature. Graphical 
depiction of the networks above, and representative degree distributions bellow. 
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2.4.2 Network Analysis of Financial Markets 
“The origin of large but rare cascades that are triggered by small initial shocks is a 
phenomenon that manifests itself as diversely as cultural fads, collective action, the diffusion 
of norms and innovations, and cascading failures in infrastructure and organizational 
networks.” (D. J. Watts, 2002). In financial systems, cascade events can lead to large scale 
failures that network analysis can help to identify in advance, thus flagging, for example, to a 
regulator as a “keep an eye” on the counterparty/entity or potential risky situation (in case of a 
failure that can affect the network). 
From the Section 2.2 it is already clear that the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives are 
complex products that were in the shadow until the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR) brought transparency and more predictability about the activity of its participants. 
(Yellen, 2013) stated that complex links among financial market participants and institutions 
are embedded in the modern global financial system, where different agents’ active in the 
financial system engage in transactions with cross-border participants. Such kind of interactions 
apply a degree of complexity into the network, which may amplify existing market frictions, 
information asymmetries, or even external factors. 
Complete networks, where banks benefit from diversified funding streams, can be more 
robust. Hence, a liquidity shock is less likely to cause harm to another bank since, due to its 
completeness, the shock could be disseminated through all banks within the network. In 
incomplete networks, on the other hand, institutions can be more exposed to failures due to 
shocks in one of its players. However, depending on the topology of the underlying network of 
interdependences between institutions, the system can be more susceptible to random or 
targeted failures/external shocks. For instance, in heterogeneous networks (e.g., Scale-Free 
networks), in which a few players accumulate the majority of the relationships and play a central 
role, the system is resilient to random failures but largely susceptible to failures that target the 
few most central elements in the network. Which in case of a failure would lead largely to the 
collapse of the system. In contrast, networks lacking degree heterogeneity are more resilient to 
targeted failures (since there is no particular set of players in the system that accumulates a 
strong relevance in its functioning) and more susceptible to random failure events. 
Financial markets have a diverse set of market participants from big banks, to big corporate 
companies, and hedge funds up to individual investors than can be more sophisticated (called 
professional investors) or less sophisticated (called non-professional investors). The risks 
linked to the occurrences that harm the relationships between the participants within the 
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financial market are called systemic risk. (Cont, 2010) highlights that the dimension of 
contagion lies on the structure of the network rather than the size of its largest participants. 
(Caccioli, Barucca, & Kobayashi, 2018), highlighted the use of the network analysis in the 
study of systemic risk in the financial markets because the interactions between the 
counterparties/entities within the market can be represented as “a network of financial linkages 
between institutions”. 
In this work, we followed a similar approach to the previous taken by other authors (Abad 
et al., 2016; Kenny et al., 2016) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
in its first overview of the Derivatives Market in 2017 (European Securities and Markets 
Authority, 2017) and its statistical report (European Securities and Markets Authority, 2018b). 
The similarities reflect the different approaches in what relates to the (i) time frame; and/or (ii) 
the Trade Repository (TR) from which the data set was retrieve; and/or (iii) the asset classes 
subject to the analysis; and/or (iv) the scope; and/or (v) the data set type.  Table 1 shows a 
comparison between each of the aforementioned studies. 
 
Table 1 - Other studies using EMIR reporting data 
Item Levels et al, 
2018 
ESMA, 2018 ESMA, 2017 Abad et al, 2016 Kenny et al, 2016 
Time Frame 1 Dec. 2015/ 31 
Dec. 2016  
Jan./Oct. 2018 24 Feb. 2017 22 Nov. 2015 1 Sep. 2015 
TR DTCC All All DTCC DTCC 
Asset Class CDS All All CDS, FX, and IRS CDS 
Scope Dutch Market EU Market EU Market EU Market Irish Market 
Data set type Transaction 
Report 
State Report State Report State Report State Report 
As this is the first time the data is used to get insight on the Portuguese OTC Derivatives 
Market and considering the expected dimension of the Market, it was decided to use all the data 
available from all the TRs on the pre-selected dates (detailed in the following section - Section 
3). 
The decision to use data from all the TRs that receive the reports of entities active in the 
Portuguese OTC Derivatives Market provides a wider view; as it (i) will be the first snapshot 
of the Market; and (ii) will allow to start the quality data assessment for regulatory purposes. 
(Kenny et al., 2016) highlighted in its paper the importance of the use of this data as a tool to 
monitor financial and stability risks. 
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Moreover, it will allow to assess the Portuguese OTC Derivatives Market in comparison 
with the European (EU) landscape presented in ESMA statistical reports (proximity only at this 
stage due to the different time frames used for the data collection in both reports: data from the 
year of 2017 – ESMA versus 2018 – this paper). 
Additionally, in those cases where there was not a harmonised approach regarding the 
aforementioned papers, towards the variables or the values to be excluded, all choices taken in 
this work are explained in the Section 4. 
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3. DATA, COLLECTION AND VARIABLE SELECTION 
Here we describe the pipeline used for the data collection and feature selection performed 
ahead of the network inference of the Portuguese Over-the-Counter (OTC) Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS) Derivatives Market. The pipeline includes the identification of the different types 
of active entities in the Portuguese OTC CDS Market and subject to the transaction reporting 
under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). A detailed discussion of the 
data processing and the network inference is done in Section 4. The main data sets used in this 
work were collected via the Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). The 
TRACE contains Derivative positions and transactions of European entities, reported in 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) format since February 2014. Given the large volume of 
data available we decided to extract only one representative day per month for the year of 2018: 
26th January, the 23rd February, the 30th March, the 27th April, the 25th May, the 29th June, the 
27th July, the 31st August, the 28th September, the 31st October, the 30th November and the 28th 
December.  
The Figure 7 below shows the process taken to perform this study. 
 
Figure 7 – Diagram of depicting the flow of the methodology adopted, Step by Step 
 
 
Three additional data sets were used to complement the data collected from TRACE: (1) 
Exchange Rates published periodically by the Portuguese Central Bank (Banco de Portugal7); 
(2) Portuguese International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) codes from the CMVM 
internal data base; and (3) all the issued Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) codes from the Global 
Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) website8. A breakdown of the possible status for 
a LEI Code is shown in Figure 19 of the Annex. 
After the collection of all data from the different sources, the data was anonymised due to 
the obligation of professional secrecy applied to all persons who work or have worked for the 
competent authorities, or for auditors and experts instructed by the competent authorities or the 
 
7 https://www.bportugal.pt/taxas-cambio.  
8 https://www.gleif.org/en/. 
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European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). No confidential information shall be 
divulged, except in an aggregated form to prevent the identification of the entities - Article 83 
of EMIR (Professional secrecy). The full raw data set includes a list of 129 variables 
(Regulatory Technical Standard (European Comission, 2017)/Implementation Technical 
Standard (European Commission, 2017)). To perform our analysis, we extracted a subset of 24 
variables that prove to be adequate for the inference of the Portuguese OT CCDS Derivatives 
Market network and its analysis. The variables considered are: Reporting Counterparty ID; ID 
of the other Counterparty; Country of the other Counterparty; Type of ID of the Other 
Counterparty; Report submitting entity ID; Clearing member ID; Beneficiary ID; Counterparty 
side; Value of contract; Contract type; Asset class; Product identification type; Product 
identification; Underlying identification type; Underlying identification; Trade ID; Venue of 
execution; Notional; Execution timestamp; Maturity date; Confirmation timestamp; Cleared; 
CCP; Reference Entity; and Intragroup. 
A description of the above listed variables can be found in the Section 7 – Annex (Table 
14). Even though from the 24 variables only a smaller number were used, the remaining were 
crucial in the cleaning process and in the engineering of new explanatory variables. 
To meet the objectives of this working paper, we have further included the following 
variables created: 
• “Country of the Reporting Counterparty ID”, identifies the country of the counterparty 
that submitted the report with a two-character encoding (PT9, UK10, US11, …) that 
follows the ISO 3166 standard code defined by the International Organization for 
Standardization, obtained from cross referencing the LEI code of the reporting 
counterparty in the data set from TRACE System and the LEI code in the data set 
retrieved from Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) website; 
•  “Product_Country”, identifies the country of the financial instrument object of the 
transaction with a two-character encoding (PT12, UK13, US14, …) following the ISO 
3166 standard code defined by the International Organization for Standardization, we 
used data from the TRACE System and the CMVM internal data base; 
 
9 Portugal. 
10 United Kingdom. 
11 United States of America. 
12 Portugal. 
13 United Kingdom. 
14 United States of America. 
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• “Gross_Notional”, the data in the raw data set can be presented in different currencies. 
For comparison, we converted the notional amount (“Notional15”) to Euros. The date 
used for the conversion was the date of the submission of the state report to the Trade 
Repository (TR). We used data from TRACE System and Banco de Portugal data set 
to generate this variable. 
An example of all the variables information (both original and created) can be found in the 
Section 7 – Annex (Table 15).   
 
15 Field 20 (Section 2c) of RTS 2017/104 and ITS 2017/105. 
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4. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS ANALYSIS (CDS) 
In the following Subsections, all the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 
data refers to the state reports obtained from the Trade Repositories (TRs) in twelve days of 
2018:  26th January, 23rd February, 30th March, 27th April, 25th May, 29th June, 27th July, 31st 
August, 28th September, 31st October, 30th November, and 28th December. However, it should 
be noted that for the purposes of the network visualisation, it was selected only one of those 
days: the 28th of December as it provides a snapshot of the market on that moment in time. 
Currently only six (6) TR provide the service to the Portuguese OTC Derivatives Market16: 
CME Trade Repository Ltd. (CME), DTCC Derivatives Repository Plc (DTCC), ICE Trade 
Vault Europe Ltd. (ICE), Krajowy Depozyt Papierów Wartosciowych S.A. (KDPW), Regis 
TR, S.A. (Regis-TR), UnaVista Limited (Unavista). The full list of the approved TRs is in 
Table 15 of the Annex to this paper. 
 
4.1. PROCESSING OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS DATA 
Here we discuss the processing of the data from the different TRs necessary to perform the 
network analysis of the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market. In our work we considered 
reports eligible to represent the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market, as all reports related 
to transactions that are executed (i) by at least one Portuguese counterparty, thus any non-
Portuguese counterparty involved in an OTC transaction with a national counterparty will be 
included; or (ii) between foreigner counterparties on a Portuguese financial instrument, e.g. 
CDS identified with a Portuguese International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). Not 
within the scope of this work, but also available via the TRs, are derivative transactions of 
foreign counterparties on derivative products within a Portuguese Stock Exchange (Regulated 
Market). 
The preparation process will follow the approach conducted in previous works at the 
European (EU) level by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (European 
Securities and Markets Authority, 2018b) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
(Abad et al., 2016). These Steps aim at: (i) identify inconsistencies; (ii) data selection; and (iii) 
treatment of the data sets for the year of 2018. Each observation corresponds to one day of each 
month:  26th January, 23rd February, 30th March, 27th April, 25th May, 29th June, 27th July, 31st 
 
16 From a total of nine registered TRs, but only six of them have useful data on the Portuguese Derivatives Market. The updated 
list of TRs can be found at ESMA website: https://www.esma.europa.eu/supervision/trade-repositories/list-registered-trade-
repositories. 
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August, 28th September, 31st October, 30th November, and 28th December. Table 2 summarises 
the number observations for each month, before and after the data processing (initial data set, 
final data set, and variation in percentage). Overall, after the cleaning process the resulting data 
sets account for less than 1% of the corresponding original monthly data set. To obtain the 
working data set the Steps described below need to be performed sequentially. 
Table 2 – Number of observations per data set in the Credit Default Swaps. 
  Initial Final Percentage 
January 213,551 1,617 0.76% 
February 200,696 1,687 0.84% 
March 199,933 1,569 0.78% 
April 222,858 1,849 0.83% 
May 220,503 1,898 0.86% 
June 268,361 1,416 0.53% 
July 245,863 1,476 0.60% 
August 264,346 2,042 0.77% 
September 250,596 1,965 0.78% 
October 262,423 2,076 0.79% 
November 266,019 2,135 0.80% 
December 254,049 1,871 0.74% 
 
The cleaning process starts by compiling each data set from the 6 Trade Repositories into a 
single data set. 
Step one, we kept only the reports related to the transactions in Credit Derivatives, meaning 
all transactions identified by a CR in the field “Asset Class17”. 
Step two, all transactions that did not refer to the OTC Derivatives Market are discarded, 
e.g., all transactions not identified as “XXXX” or “XOFF” in the “Venue of Execution18” field 
were deleted. 
Step three, we have dropped all reports where the fields of the counterparty of the trade 
(either the “Reporting Counterparty ID19” or the “ID of the other Counterparty20”) were left 
blank or did not have a valid Legal Entity Identifier (LEI). The only exception being the 
counterparties identified with a client code (CLC) in the field: “ID of the other Counterparty21” 
as long as it fulfilled one of the report requirements that makes such report identifiable within 
the Portuguese OTC Derivatives Market: the transactions refers to a Portuguese CDS or if the 
 
17 Field 2 (Section 2a) of RTS 2017/104 & ITS 2017/105. 
18 Field 17 of RTS 2017/104 & ITS 2017/105. 
19 Field 2 of of RTS 2017/104 & ITS 2017/105. 
20 Field 4 of RTS 2017/104 & ITS 2017/105. 
21 Field 4 of RTS 2017/104 & ITS 2017/105. 
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counterparty to the transaction (“Reporting Counterparty ID”) had a Portuguese LEI code (see 
Section 4.2 above). We include this data in the first analysis and  deviated from the cleaning 
process performed by (Abad et al., 2016) as we considered that for the first insight on the 
Portuguese OTC Derivatives Market it should be used the “biggest” sample of data as possible. 
Moreover, this data could also be used at a later stage to identify the weight of the CLC by the 
market players and consider a dedicated supervision action plan. Later on (Subsection 4.2.2) 
we have excluded the reports containing CLC, and performed a new analysis for comparison 
purposes with other studies published. 
Step four, all observations where the variable that represents the mark-to-market “Value of 
Contract22” is missing are discarded from the analysis (Abad et al., 2016). 
Step five, to be able to aggregate the transactions after the pre-processing phase and make 
them comparable (transactions are reported in different currencies) the notional amount of the 
transactions was converted to the Euro. To that end, we have used the exchange rates published 
by Banco de Portugal, using the exchange rate for the date of the state report. At this stage we 
performed an inconsistency check. All the observations with a Notional23 below 103 Euros were 
considered as a misreporting (Abad et al., 2016; Kenny et al., 2016) and those above 109 Euros 
were considered as outliers (Abad et al., 2016). In both situations, the observations were 
discarded. 
Step six, we discarded the duplicated reports in a few Steps. Since under the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) all European counterparties must report the side of 
the transaction in which they are involved (the buyer shall report its side of the transaction and 
the seller shall report its side of the transaction), it introduces a duplication of reports whenever 
the transaction involves two European counterparties. Hence, we need to accurately treat these 
duplications. First, we select the unique transactions per “Trade ID”, secondly match 
transactions with the same “Trade ID”, third aggregate the information. Concerning the last 
point, all transactions with the same “Trade ID” are identified and a consistency check is 
performed, e.g., the notional amount reported, the counterparties and the maturity date had to 
coincide, additionally, the counterparty side could not be equal (the buyer should be identified 
with a “B” and a seller with a “S”). For the network analysis a unique report is used, as describe 
in the following Subsection. 
 
22 Field 17 of RTS 2017/104 and ITS 2017/105. 
23 The notional amount of an over-the-counter derivative contract is typically measured as the market value or, in the case of 
bond derivatives, the face value of the asset whose risk is transferred by the derivative. 
42 
 
The reports discarded during Steps four to seven were stored for future internal in-depth 
analysis. These might in the future allow to: (i) understand the degree of misreporting; (ii) 
identify the counterparties that are responsible for the misreporting; and (iii) implement 
dedicated supervision actions. It is noteworthy to mention that if this work had not required 
such an exhaustive treatment of the data, many of these situations would have, most likely, 
remained unaccounted. 
Four additional Steps were performed to ensure that the data sets obtained would be 
consistent for aggregation and for the network analysis focused on the first phase on the 
Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market. 
Step seven, reports without a maturity date are discarded as they do not allow to verify if the 
contract is still open and, thus, its effective weight in the network. 
Step eight, reports flagged with “Y” in the “Intragroup24” field that refer to transactions 
between entities from the same group are discarded as they do not pose the same risk as the 
interactions between distinct counterparties. 
Step nine, all reports that are related to Credit Derivatives but not to its sub-asset class: 
Credit Default Swaps are also discarded. 
Step ten, reports that are not related to transactions that are executed (i) by at least one 
Portuguese counterparty; or (ii) between foreigner counterparties on a Portuguese OTC CDS, 
e.g. a financial instrument identified with a Portuguese International Securities Identification 
Number (ISIN) in the “Underlying Identification25” are discarded as fall out the scope of this 
paper – Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market. 
We have eliminated the CDS indexes and baskets while performing the analysis of its OTC 
Portuguese Market. Such approach follows the same path as the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ERSB) paper (Abad et al., 2016), where it was decided to exclude those reports as it is not 
identified by an ISIN, hence difficult to link to a country. 
At this point we had the necessary data set to draw the networks on the PT Products + PT 
Participants segment (counterparty, and country), and to identify the active players within. 
Before moving a Step forward, we made a sanity check to all reports identified with a “N” or 
left blank in the “Cleared26” field and checked if it was accurate, e.g., the transaction did not 
fell under one of the following conditions: 
 
24 Field 38 (Section 2e) of RTS 2017/104 and ITS 2017/105. 
25 Field 8 (Section 2b) of RTS 2017/104 and ITS 2017/105. 
26 Field 35 (Section 2e) of RTS 2017/104 and ITS 2017/105. 
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• One of the counterparties to the transaction was identified with a LEI of a Central 
Counterparty (CCP); or 
• The field “CCP27” is filled with an accurate LEI of a CCP. 
Sixteen reports, representing 0,86% of the data set fulfilled at least one of the conditions. 
We replaced all the flags from “N” to “Y” since a report involving a CCP always refer to a 
cleared transaction. Nevertheless, we took note of the misreports, and saved the data for future 
analysis. 
On a second stage, we further restricted the data set in order to be able to compare the results 
with existing studies (please see Table 1 in Subsection 2.4.2 for better reference on the studies). 
Noteworthy to remember that this restriction did not made us deviate from the initial goal: focus 
on the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market. Such exercise took four more Steps and 
provided us with two smaller data sets: (i) only focused on CDS identified with a Portuguese 
ISIN (Portuguese CDS), and (ii) only focused on Portuguese counterparties, e.g. reports where 
the transactions involved at least one Portuguese counterparty. 
Step eleven, we dropped all reports were the counterparty was identified with a client code: 
CLC as the ERSB paper (Abad et al., 2016). 
Step twelve, we identified all reports that were flagged with a “Y” in the “Cleared28” field 
and a LEI code in field “CCP29” but none of the counterparties was a CCP (e.g. identified with 
the LEI of a CCP) and rebuild the transactions. Reports falling under this situation accounted 
for 1% of the data set. Each report was replaced by two reports where all details were kept 
unchanged apart from the counterparties where the CCP assumed an intermediate role: 
 
 
 
 
27 Field 37 (Section 2e) of RTS 2017/104 and ITS 2017/105. 
28 Field 35 (Section 2e) of RTS 2017/104 & ITS 2017/105. 
29 Field 37 (Section 2e) of RTS 2017/104 & ITS 2017/105. 
Figure 8 – Different types of relationships. a) Initial transaction report involving two 
counterparties that cleared through a CCP. b) Transaction report involving two 
counterparties that cleared through a CCP after the “rebuilding process”. 
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To allow the accurate mapping, we rerun the cross check of the country of each of the 
counterparties. It is not only important for the clear identification of the reports to keep in the 
last Step of the cleaning process (Step fourteen) by considering the country of the counterparties 
but also to draw the country network in the following Subsection.  
Step thirteen, we dropped all reports where the product was not a financial instrument 
identified as a Portuguese CDS, e.g. a CDS with a Portuguese International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN). At this point we obtained the data set to build the network that 
represents the PT Products segment. 
Step fourteen, we dropped all reports where the transactions were not performed by at least 
one Portuguese counterparty. Finally, we obtained the data set to build the network that 
represents the PT Participants segment. 
All the Steps described above were taken for all the twelve data sets. Table 3 summarises 
the above-mentioned Steps and indicates the number of reports remaining after each Step. 
Table 3 – Processing of Credit Default Swaps data from the data set of 28th December. The Steps show how the 
number of reports were filtered from raw data to the working data set. Each Step was implemented in a 
sequential order (from top to bottom). The number of observations tracks the size of the working data set after 
each Step. 
Step Number of observations 
0. Bulk data (all asset classes) 1,400,172 
1. Raw data (Credit Derivatives) 254,049 
2. Removal On-Exchange trades 228,812 
3. Removal blank Counterparty ID 226,744 
4. Removal erroneous value of contract 187,416 
5. Removal notional below 1k and above 1bn Euros 185,745 
6. Removal of Duplicates 150,015 
7. Removal blank maturity date 149,832 
8. Removal intragroup flag set to “Y” 128,978 
9. Removal all non-CDS reports 117,850 
10. Removal Non-Portuguese OTC CDS30 (PT 
Products + PT Participants segment 1,871 
11. Removal all reports where the counterparty is 
identified with a CLC  1,850 
12. Rebuild the network 1,869 
13. Removal non-Portuguese ISIN (PT Products 
segment) 1,814 
14. Removal non-Portuguese counterparties (non-PT 
Participants segment)  55 
 
 
30  Single name Portuguese OTC CDS. 
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Due to the reduced number of liable data31, the final data sets (e.g. the ones to be used in the 
network analysis) were considered only as a sample of the population (EMIR data representing 
each segment of the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market). Each data set that was labelled 
for better reference, and are discussed in the following Subsections: 
• PT Products and PT Participants segment (e.g., data set obtained in Step 10 above) 
- 1,871 reports (observations) submitted by 156 counterparties to the TRs, which 
represents all the transactions involving any non- Portuguese counterparty involved 
in a transaction of a Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives, or at least one Portuguese 
counterparty in an OTC CDS Derivatives Market; 
• PT Products segment (e.g., data set obtained in Step 13 above)– 1,814 reports 
(observations) submitted by 133 counterparties to the TRs, which represents all 
reported transactions by counterparties involving a Portuguese OTC CDS 
Derivatives, irrespectively of the country of origin, and excluding counterparties 
identified with the CLC; and 
• PT Participants segment (e.g., data set obtained in Step 14 above) – 55 reports 
(observations) submitted by 15 counterparties to the TRs, which represents all the 
transactions involving at least one Portuguese counterparty in an OTC CDS 
Derivatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Reports per clearing type in the (1) PT Products + Portuguese segment, (2) PT Products 
segment; and (3) Portuguese Participants segment in the 28th December 2018 type 
 
31 Data obtained after the pre-processing phase. 
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The Figure 9 shows that there is a balance between the “Cleared” and “Not-Cleared” 
transactions within the state report of 28th December of 2018 for two of the final data sets 
representing the PT Products + PT Participants segment and the PT Products segment. 
However, the cleared transactions are slightly higher and accounts for more than 53% in both 
cases. There is a marginal number of reports submitted to the TRs without information in this 
field, which by cross referencing the information with the field “CCP32” we realised refer to 
cleared transactions and therefore we replace the blank field by a “Y”. Those reports account 
for 0.21% of the data set. Our values are in line with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
report from the end of 2018 on OTC Derivatives (Bank for International Settlement (BIS), 
2019), which reported 55% of outstanding OTC CDS Derivatives cleared through a Central 
Counterparty (CCPs) during the analysis period.  
 
Figure 10 – Percentage of entities submitting reports in the (1) PT Products + PT Participants segment (2) PT 
Products segment; and (3) PT Participants segment, per counterparty type in the 28th December 2018 
The Figure 10 highlights the distribution per counterparty type of the active players on the 
Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market. As it may be seen there is the hegemony of the 
members of the Group of Sixteen (G16) and the CCP, that account for more than 50% and 40% 
respectively for the data sets representing the PT Products + PT Participants segment, and 
 
32 Field 37 (Section 2e) of RTS 2017/104 and ITS 2017/105. 
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the data set representing the PT Products segment. On the other hand, the data set focused on 
the PT Participants segment is dominated by the Banks which account for almost 90% 
(89.1%). These findings are complemented in Subsection 4.2 where we represent and discuss 
the network structure of the three segments defined to represent the Portuguese OTC CDS 
Derivatives Market.  
Table 4 - Matrix of share of interaction between counterparty types, per transaction report on the 28th December 
(CLC – Client Code; FC – Financial Counterparty; NFC – Non-Financial Counterparty; G16 – Group of 
Sixteen; CCP – Central Counterparty) for three data sets 
PT Products + PT Participants segment  
  Bank CCP CLC FC Fund G16 NFC 
Bank 0.1% 0% 0% 0.9% 0% 2.2% 0% 
CCP 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 56.7% 0% 
FC 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.7% 0% 
Fund 0% 0% 0.1% 0% 0% 0.8% 0% 
G16 2.6% 13.1% 0.2% 0.5% 2.6% 19.2% 0.2% 
Total 2.7% 13.1% 0.3% 1.6% 2.6% 79.5% 0.2% 
 
 
PT Products segment 
  Bank CCP FC Fund G16 NFC 
Bank 0% 0.2% 0% 0% 1.4% 0% 
CCP 0.06% 0% 0.04% 0% 58.1% 0% 
FC 0% 0.04% 0% 0% 0.6% 0% 
Fund 0% 0.2% 0% 0% 0.6% 0% 
G16 2.5% 13.4% 0.5% 2.7% 19.5% 0.2% 
Total 3% 14% 1% 3% 80% 0% 
 
 
A closer look into the relationships per counterparty types of the PT Product + PT 
Participants segment (represented by the gross notional of the transactions between them) 
allowed us to see that the market is concentrated in two main group of players: the G16, and 
the CCP where more than 70% of transactions took place between the G16 players and the G16 
players and the CCPs (see Table 4 above) for two of the data sets: the one representing the PT 
Products + PT Participants segment and the PT Products segment. The smaller data set, e.g. 
the PT Participants segment is dominated by the banks and the G16 that account for more 
than 55%.  
 
PT Participants segment  
 Bank FC G16 
Bank 7.7% 32.3% 44.5% 
FC 0.0% 10.5% 0.0% 
G16 4.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 12.7% 42.8% 44.5% 
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4.2. CDS NETWORK ANALYSIS 
In this Subsection, each counterparty (or the country of a counterparty) to a Credit Default 
Swap (CDS) transaction is represented by a node in the network and the relationships between 
counterparties or the country of a counterparty (nodes) are represented by a link. For 
simplification, and visualisation reasons, links connecting the same counterparties were 
aggregated by the notional amount of the transactions (“Gross Notional”). 
As previously identified by other authors (Abad et al., 2016; Kenny et al., 2016)  and by the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in its Derivatives statistical report 
(European Securities and Markets Authority, 2018b), the network analysis provides regulators 
a tool to map the interconnectedness of derivative transactions, their possible contagion paths, 
while allowing to understand the systemic risk across a range of financial systems and sectors. 
The network analysis will use different samples (data sets) for the analysis. All of those data 
sets went through the same data cleaning process as described in Table 3 of Subsection 4.1 
and exemplified for the final data set: 28th December 2018 Hence, we have:  thirty-six files 
representing each month of 2018 (12 for each  subset): (i) PT Products + PT Participants 
segment; (ii) PT Products segment, and (iii) PT Participants, from which we performed the 
network inference and characterisation; and three single files representing each final data set 
(dated of 28th December 2018) representing the three aforementioned data sets that will be used 
for the networks visualisation. 
Additionally, we considered that the networks (focused on the counterparty interactions or 
in the country of those counterparties) are (i) Undirected as for the study in hands we assumed 
that two counterparties/countries are related in some way. These relationships exist, 
irrespectively of the balance of their transactions (e.g. who has the biggest position, or who was 
the seller and who was the buyer in the transaction); and (ii) Weighted by the value of the 
“Gross Notional” involved in the transactions between two counterparties/countries. The 
“Gross Notional” of each transaction was aggregated and used to measure the weight of the 
relationships. 
It is noteworthy to mention that for ease of providing a graphical representation of the 
networks, unweighted versions of the same structures were used instead. The unweighted 
networks were obtained by conserving that links between counterparties only exist if at least 
one transaction was observed between them irrespectively of the position held by each one 
(buyer or seller of the transaction) or the amount (“Gross Notional”) involved in the transaction. 
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4.2.1 PT Products + PT Participants segment  
This Subsection will provide details of the network analysis for the data set focused on the 
Portuguese Product and Portuguese Participants , meaning that we used the monthly data sets 
of Section 4.1, that includes reports related to transactions executed by at least one Portuguese 
counterparty or reports related to transactions on Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives 
irrespectively of the country of origin of the counterparties involved in such transaction to 
perform the network inference and the characterisation using the data set of 28th December 
2018. 
 On average, there were 149 active counterparties on the PT Products + PT Participants 
segment network in the year of 2018. Being the month of April the one that registered the lowest 
number of active counterparties (127), and July the highest (168). Table 5, summarises the 
main network metrics per month.  
 
Table 5 – Network analysis metrics for the PT Products + PT Participants segment, including the number of 
nodes in the network (N), the average degree (〈𝒌〉), the density of links, the maximum degree (𝒎𝒂𝒙(𝒌)), the 
diameter of the network (diam), the average path length (APL), the Cluster Coefficient (CC), and the variance 
of the degree distribution (𝒗𝒂𝒓(𝒌)) 
  N <k> Density max(k) diam APL CC var(k) 
January 148 3.176 0.022 39 5 3.004 0.28 33.91 
February 152 3.211 0.021 36 6 2.998 0.27 34.22 
March 137 3.309 0.025 33 6 2.907 0.29 38.47 
April 127 3.559 0.028 34 6 2.838 0.28 35.48 
May 132 3.561 0.027 34 6 2.818 0.31 36.77 
June 139 3.295 0.024 42 6 2.831 0.23 37.06 
July 168 3.238 0.019 49 6 2.807 0.38 46.09 
August 152 3.553 0.024 49 6 2.746 0.43 49.57 
September 152 3.553 0.024 49 6 2.754 0.44 49.56 
October 163 3.656 0.023 49 6 2.825 0.34 50.16 
November 165 3.636 0.022 51 6 2.816 0.37 50.83 
December 156 3.679 0.024 52 6 2.835 0.4 49.88 
 
 The diameter of the network, which represents the maximum shortest distance between two 
nodes in a network (number of links separating two nodes), in this case the longest path that a 
counterparty has to run to its furthest counterparty was constantly at six for the last eleven 
months, and five for the month of January 2018. 
The average degree of the PT Products+ PT Participants segment increased during the 
year of 2018, being December the month that registered the highest value. This means that the 
number of counterparties for each participant active in the Market registered fluctuate during 
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the year and ended with a slight increase. Such increase was mostly due to the increase of 
diversification in the relationships of the Group of Sixteen (G16). The maximum degree also 
increased along the year, which consolidated the previous statement. The G16 players and the 
Central Counterparty (CCP) assumed the main roles in the networks in 2018.  
The networks exhibit a very sparse connectivity structure, as only an average lower than 3% 
of the possible links between counterparties exist. Such a low value indicates that the market 
might be highly susceptible to the existing relationships and be susceptible to the collapse of 
some of its central elements.  
The average path length, which measures the average shortest path between all pair of nodes, 
was approximately three in all the data sets analysed. 
The papers of (Abad et al., 2016; Kenny et al., 2016) highlighted that the main players of 
the CDS market are the G16 and the CCPs, which is also the case for the PT Product + PT 
Participants segment network, despite the extended conditions (see Section 4.1 for details). 
Indeed, we observe that the G16 players (i) have the highest number of relationships with other 
counterparties and between themselves; (ii) serve as intermediates between other players in the 
market; and (iii) are very well connected with the other important players of the network, and 
therefore have the power to influence the other participants in the PT Product + PT 
Participants segment network. These three observations are supported, respectively, by the 
Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector centralities. The top 5 most central players were 
constantly from the G16 and the CCP . 
Same behavior was observed for the network drawn using the data set that followed the 
restrictions of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) (Abad et al., 2016): PT Products 
segment.  
The Figure 11 shows the degree distribution of the PT Product + PT Participants segment 
in 28th December 2018. The majority (88%) of the counterparties interact with the maximum 
of five counterparties, and 54% with a single counterparty. Both percentages are slightly higher 
than the one reported by (Abad et al., 2016), which may be explained by the existence in our 
data set of reports with counterparties identified by the Client Code (CLC). Such highly 
heterogeneous networks (Gao, Liu, Li, & Havlin, 2015) are known to be very susceptible to 
target attacks, and as such events for which the highly central nodes might be more susceptible 
pose a high systemic risk to the entire system. 
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Figure 11– Degree distribution per number of counterparties 
To explain, for the first time, the existing relationships in the PT Product + PT Participants 
segment it was drafted three graphic representation of the market – see Figure 12 for the data 
set of the 28th December 2018.  
The construction process of the network was based on the addition of a link between two 
nodes (representing the relationship between the counterparties in a transaction) as long as at 
least one transaction on a CDS contract was observed between them. The size of the nodes is 
proportional to the transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) – ”Gross Notional”, whereas 
the thickness of the links is proportional to the transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) – 
”Gross Notional” between the two counterparties. Self-loops (transactions where both sides of 
the transaction had the same Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) code were also excluded as it does 
not represent the same risk to the transaction chain. 
Counterparties are colored to highlight their types: ((i) G16 in bright green; (ii) CCP in red; 
(iii) Banks in magenta; (iv) Funds in orange; (v) Financial Counterparties (FC) in blue; (vi) 
Non-Financial Counterparties (NFC) in black; (vii) counterparties identified by CLC in grey 
and (viii) in light blue the Portuguese players irrespectively of their counterparty type. 
In the CDS networks there is a core of larger nodes (i.e., having a higher number of links) 
that can be distinguished from the peripheral nodes, which are smaller and less linked to the 
other counterparties. In fact, with a few exceptions, peripheral nodes are mostly connected 
towards the core and much less to other peripheral nodes. The giant components of the networks 
are graphically represented in Figure 12 (degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality 
measures), and provide a good overview of some interesting features: the dominance and 
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centrality of the G1633; the CCPs and a few banks that trade with peripheral entities and 
between each other, irrespectively of the centrality measured. For the complete network (giant 
and small components) please refer to Figure 20 in Section 7. Despite not being equal, these 
findings are qualitatively similar to previous work by (Abad et al., 2016; Peltonen et al., 2014) 
and  are in line with the more recent work of (D’Errico et al., 2018; Gross & Siklos, 2018). In 
the latter, the authors identified a sectoral clustering in the CDS network, with the center 
occupied by the financial institutions (G16, Banks, FC, Funds), and Non-Financial 
Counterparties (NFC) grouped around it. 
It is noteworthy to mention that the giant component is qualitatively similar to one found 
and discussed in previous studies using EMIR CDS data (Abad et al., 2016). However, the PT 
Product + PT Participants segment has three smaller unconnected components: the largest 
components of the two has a G16 player at its center working as the link between seven 
peripheral counterparties, all of which are funds; the mid-size component is comprised by 4 
funds and 2 entities identified with the CLC, where the CLCs have a relationship (link) with 
all the funds; and the smaller components connects only two players, a Portuguese counterparty 
and a Financial Counterparty (FC). 
The PT Product + PT Participants segment has six Portuguese players of which one is part 
of the smaller component with only two nodes. The remaining five Portuguese counterparties 
are part of the giant component where four are peripheral and only one (a Portuguese bank) 
serves as a connection between two central nodes. 
  
 
33 Includes all entities that belong to the G16 company, e.g., JP Morgan and JP Morgan Securities.  
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Figure 12- Undirected and unweighted network (PT Product + PT Participants segment) of 
counterparty-counterparty of gross notional amount (per degree, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality), 
highlighting the Portuguese counterparties within the network. The size of each of the 140 counterparties 
(nodes) is proportional to the transactions gross notional amount (in Euros), and the thickness of each of the 
271 relationships (links) is proportional to the transactions gross notional. 
The Table 6 below provides a closer look to the top 5 counterparties per centrality measure, 
we observed that the most influence counterparty, e.g., a counterparty that if fails will have the 
most impact in the network is “4”. This counterparty has the highest: (i) degree (highest number 
of links with other counterparties in the network), (ii) betweenness (serve as link between other 
counterparties in the network), and (iii) Eigenvector (high number of links with other 
counterparties well connected). It is noteworthy to mention the counterparty “1”, which scope 
is more limited than the others within the degree top 5 as does not share the same level of links 
with the “very well connected” counterparties (eigenvector). 
All counterparties in the top 5 per Degree centrality belong to the G16 group. 
 
Table 6 – Top 5 counterparties per Degree centrality and its placement regarding the other two centrality 
measures: Betweenness and Eigenvector for the PT Product + PT Participants segment. The place id identified 
in brackets after the value. 
# Counterparty ID Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
1 4 52 3,466.01 (1) 1 (1) 
2 12 40 2,361.43 (2) 0.95 (2) 
3 3 36 2,012.37 (3) 0.79 (3) 
4 10 27 1,699.21(5) 0.76 (4) 
5 1 26 1,505.76 (4) 0.27 (18) 
 
To unveil the ties between countries in which counterparties are hosted, a new network was 
built that focuses in the country of each counterparty involved in the PT Product + PT 
Participants segment. The construction process executed for the first network was replicated 
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from the same initial data set, dated of 28th December 2018. A few minor albeit necessary 
adaptations were done, as the country-country network will be focused on the country of the 
counterparty rather than the counterparty itself. For that purpose, we cross referenced the Legal 
Entity Identifier (LEI) code of the fields “Reporting Counterparty” and “Country of the other 
Counterparty” with the information in the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) 
data base and used the country reported in the field “Country of the other Counterparty” for 
those cases where no match was found in GLEIF data set. 
Following the same process as above, the thickness of the links is proportional to the 
transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) – “Gross Notional” between the countries where 
the counterparties involved in the transaction are based on. Self-loops (transactions where both 
sides of the transaction had the same LEI code) were also excluded as it does not represent the 
same risk to the transaction chain. 
To facilitate the visual inspection of the network, and provide quicker information, nodes 
have been replaced by the flags of the country they represent. A black flag with double X was 
used to represent all reports where the “Country of the other Counterparty34” field shows “XX”, 
which account for 8% of the total number of reports. The value “XX” is, according to the ISO 
3166 Codes35, acceptable to reference countries that have no country code as per this standard. 
Therefore, we kept in both the analysis and the graphical representation as long as meets the 
criteria pre-established to belong to the PT Product + PT Participants segment (see Section 
4.1 above). Reports where the counterparties used the “EU” in the “Country of the other 
Counterparty36” were also kept. Both acceptances pose constraints to an accurate assessment 
focused on the country of the network participants as: (i) the flag “EU” and/or the flag “XX” 
could have been used  by a Portuguese counterparty which could have impact on the final 
graphical representation; and (ii) reports where the “Other Counterparty” is identified with the 
LEI, it is possible to cross reference with the GLEIF and track counterparty’s country, however 
for those where the field is identified by the CLC that is not possible. We acknowledge the 
limitations of such decision as well as the potential impact in the overall picture but maintained 
these data as this work is a first glance on the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market. 
The Figure 13 represents the country network of each counterparty involved in the PT 
Product + PT Participants segment on the 28th December. The network below includes all 
those countries that are part of the transaction with a Portuguese counterparty or two foreign 
 
34 Field 5 of the RTS 2017/104 and the ITS 2017/105. 
35 https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#search. 
36 Field 5 of the RTS 2017/104 and the ITS 2017/105. 
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counterparties executing a transaction in a Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives. As reported in 
other articles on CDS under EMIR, the hegemony of the United Kingdom (UK) is clear. This 
can be justified as the UK has been historically the “home market” for the OTC transactions of 
such sub-asset class. In this sense, it can be concluded that the PT Product + PT Participants 
segment follows the tendency shown in (Abad et al., 2016) and the statistical report published 
by the European Securities and Markets Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority, 
2018b). 
 
Figure 13 – Undirected and unweighted network of gross notional amount, per country. Each of the 18 nodes 
represent a country involved in the PT Product + PT Participants segment, and the thickness of each of the 
271 relationships (links) is proportional to the aggregated transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) between 
the counterparties of the countries (based on the cleaned data set of the 28th December 2018). 
Additionally, we provide in Table 7 the top 5 country of counterparties per centrality 
measure.  We observed that the influencer country, e.g., the country that if abandons the existing 
setting will have the most impact in the network is the United Kingdom - “UK”, followed by 
France - “FR” and the United States of America - “US”. The hegemony of UK is no news, 
considering that it has been in the center of the OTC Derivatives Market in Europe, not only 
for the CDS. These three countries have the highest: (i) degree (highest number of links with 
other countries in the network), (ii) betweenness (serve as link between other countries in the 
network), and (iii) Eigenvector (high number of links with other countries well connected). It 
is noteworthy to mention that contrary to the counterparty to counterparty network above, the 
top 5 share the same level of centralities. 
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Table 7 - Top 5 counterparties per Degree centrality and its placement regarding the other two centrality 
measures: betweenness and eigenvector for the PT Product + PT Participants segment. The ranking is 
identified in brackets after the value. 
# Counterparty country Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
1 UK37 19  84 (1)   1 (1)  
2 FR38 17  63.83 (2)   0.92 (2)  
3 US39 8  7 (3)   0.61 (3)  
4 PT40 6  1.92 (4)   0.534 (4)  
5 DE41 5  0.25 (5)   0.49 (5)  
 
4.2.2 PT Products segment (OTC CDS Derivatives) 
This Subsection will provide details of the network analysis for the data set focused on the 
Portuguese Product, e.g., financial instruments identified with a Portuguese ISIN in the field 
“Underlying Identification42”. For the analysis we will use the 12 monthly data sets obtained at 
the end of Step 13 as described in Section 4.1. The network inference and characterisation was 
performed for a single data set: 28th December 2018. 
On average, there were 129 active counterparties on the PT Products segment in the year 
of 2018. Being the month of April the one that registered the lowest number of active 
counterparties (110), and July the highest (146). Table 8, summarises the main network metrics 
that characterise the networks for each monthly data set.  
 
Table 8 – Network analysis metrics for the PT Products segment, including the number of nodes in the network 
(N), the average degree (〈𝒌〉), the density of links, the maximum degree (𝒎𝒂𝒙(𝒌)), the diameter of the network 
(diam), the average path length (APL), the Cluster Coefficient (CC), and the variance of the degree distribution 
(𝒗𝒂𝒓(𝒌)) 
   N <k> Density max(k) diam APL CC var(k) 
January 131 3.221 0.025 38 5 2.907 0.372 36.83 
February 134 3.299 0.025 35 5 2.932 0.356 37.40 
March 121 3.421 0.029 33 5 2.869 0.367 37.59 
April 110 3.673 0.034 31 5 2.778 0.368 39.29 
May 114 3.684 0.033 33 4 2.747 0.413 40.64 
June 120 3.433 0.029 42 5 2.771 0.291 40.80 
July 146 3.411 0.024 47 4 2.776 0.457 48.90 
August 131 3.756 0.029 47 4 2.701 0.537 53.46 
September 130 3.785 0.029 46 4 2.709 0.541 53.23 
 
37 United Kingdom. 
38 France. 
39 United States of America. 
40 Portugal. 
41 Germany. 
42 Field 8 (Section 2b) of the RTS 2017/104 and the ITS 2017/105. 
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October 140 3.900 0.028 46 4 2.793 0.429 53.83 
November 141 3.929 0.028 48 4 2.801 0.429 54.65 
December 133 3.970 0.03 49 5 2.835 0.46 53.04 
 
The maximum shortest distance between two nodes in a network (number of links separating 
two nodes) – diameter of the network, in this case the longest path that a counterparty has to 
run to its furthest counterparty was lower than the network in Subsection 4.2.1: five for six data 
sets (January, February, March, April, June and December), and four for the remaining data 
sets (May, July, August, September, October and November). 
The average degree of the PT Products segment did not have a steady ascendant movement 
as the previous network, but we can still conclude that all an all increased during the year of 
2018, being December the month that registered the highest value (as the network in Subsection 
4.2.1). This means that the number of counterparties for each participant active in the Market 
registered fluctuate during the year and ended with a slight increase. Such increase was mostly 
due to the increase of diversification in the relationships of the Group of Sixteen (G16). The 
maximum degree also increased along the year, which consolidated the previous statement. The 
G16 players and the Central Counterparty (CCP) assumed the main roles in the network for 
the year of 2018.  
Equally, the networks exhibit a very sparse connectivity structure, as only an average of 
approximately 3% of the possible links between counterparties exist. Such a low value indicates 
that the market might be highly susceptible to the existing relationships and be susceptible to 
the collapse of some of its central elements.  
The average path length, which measures the average shortest path between all pair of nodes, 
was approximately three in all the data sets analysed. 
The papers of (Abad et al., 2016; Kenny et al., 2016) highlighted that the main players of 
the CDS market are the G16 and the CCPs, which is also the case here. Indeed, we observe 
that the G16 players (i) have the highest number of relationships with other counterparties and 
between themselves; (ii) serve as intermediates between other players in the market; and (iii) 
they are very well connected with the other important players of the network, and therefore 
have the power to influence the other participants in the PT Products segment. These three 
observations are supported, respectively, by the centralities: Degree, Betweenness, and 
Eigenvector. The top 5 most central players were always from the G16 and the CCP.  
The Figure 14 shows the degree distribution of the PT Products segment in 28th December 
2018. The majority (86%) of the counterparties interact with the maximum of five 
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counterparties, and 55% with a single counterparty. Both percentages are slightly higher than 
the one reported by (Abad et al., 2016). Such highly heterogeneous networks (Gao et al., 2015) 
are known to be very susceptible to target attacks, and as such events for which the highly 
central nodes might be more susceptible pose a high systemic risk to the entire system. 
 
 
Figure 14– Degree distribution per number of counterparties for the PT Products segment 
To explain, for the first time, the existing relationships in the PT Products segment we 
drafted three graphic representation of the market – see Figure 15 using the data set of 28th 
December 2018. 
The design process of the network was based on the addition of a link between two nodes 
(representing the relationship between the counterparties in a transaction) as long the product 
involved was a Portuguese OTC CDS (e.g. a CDS identified with a Portuguese ISIN) To be 
able to draw consideration regarding the other networks in Subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3, we 
used the same approach: (i) size of the nodes proportional to the transactions gross notional 
amount (in Euros) – ”Gross Notional”, and (ii) the thickness of the links proportional to the 
transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) – ”Gross Notional” between the two 
counterparties. Self-loops (transactions where both sides of the transaction had the same Legal 
Entity Identifier (LEI) code were also excluded as it does not represent the same risk to the 
transaction chain. 
Counterparties are colored using the same color scheme as in Subsection 4.2.1, except for 
the CLC that were not considered in the data set used (see Step 13 in Section 4.1), to highlight 
their type: ((i) G16 in bright green; (ii) CCP in red; (iii) Banks in magenta; (iv) Funds in orange; 
(v) Financial Counterparties (FC) in blue; (vi) Non-Financial Counterparties (NFC) in black; 
100 101 102
100
101
102
Degree 
Nu
m
be
r o
f N
od
es
 
Portuguese OTC CDS Degree Distribution
59 
 
(vii) counterparties identified by the client code (CLC)43 in grey and (viii) in bright blue the 
Portuguese players irrespectively of their counterparty type. 
In the CDS networks there is a core of larger nodes (i.e., having a higher number of links) 
that can be distinguished from the peripheral nodes, which are smaller and less linked to the 
other counterparties. In fact, with a few exceptions, peripheral nodes are mostly connected 
towards the core and much less to other peripheral nodes. The networks are graphically 
represented in Figure 15 (degree, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality measures), and 
provide a good overview of some interesting features: the dominance and centrality of the 
G1644; the CCPs and a few banks that trade with peripheral entities and between each other, 
irrespectively of the centrality measured. These findings are similar to previous work by (Abad 
et al., 2016; Peltonen et al., 2014) and  are in line with the more recent work of (D’Errico et al., 
2018; Gross & Siklos, 2018). In the latter, the authors identified a sectoral clustering in the 
CDS network, with the center occupied by the financial institutions (G16, Banks, FC, Funds), 
and non-financial entities (NFC) grouped around it. 
It is noteworthy to mention that the network is similar to the one found in the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) paper (Abad et al., 2016).  
The PT Products segment networks only have one giant component and none of the 
counterparties active in it is Portuguese.  
 
 
Figure 15 - Undirected and unweighted network (PT Products segment) of counterparty-counterparty of 
gross notional amount (per degree, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality), highlighting the Portuguese 
counterparties within the network. The size of each of the 133 counterparties (nodes) is proportional to the 
transactions gross notional amount (in Euros), and the thickness of each of the 264 relationships (links) is 
proportional to the transactions gross notional. 
 
43 Possible only for the non-reporting counterparty – field 4 of the RTS 2017/104 & ITS 2017/105.  
44 Includes all entities that belong to the G16 company, e.g.: JP Morgan and JP Morgan Securities.  
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The Table 9 below provides a closer look to the top 5 counterparties per centrality measure, 
where we observe that the counterparty that if fails will have the most impact in the network is 
“4”. This counterparty has the highest: (i) degree (highest number of links with other 
counterparties in the network), (ii) betweenness (serve as link between other counterparties in 
the network), and (iii) Eigenvector (high number of links with other counterparties well 
connected). It is noteworthy to mention the counterparty “23”, has a more limited scope when 
compared with the others within the degree top 5 as does not share the same level of links with 
“other very well connected” counterparties (eigenvector). To be noted that counterparty “7” 
does not have the same linkage between other counterparties in the network as the remaining 
Top 5, which is obtained by the betweenness. 
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All counterparties in the top 5 per Degree centrality belong to the G16 group. 
Table 9 - Top 5 counterparties per Degree centrality and its placement regarding the other two centrality 
measures: betweenness and eigenvector (PT Products segment). The ranking is identified in brackets after the 
value. 
# Counterparty ID Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
1 4 49  3,118.93 (1)   1 (1)  
2 8 37  1,911.80 (2)   0.94 (2)  
3 2 32  1,444.48 (4)   0.77 (3)  
4 7 26  1,413.63 (6)   0.77 (4)  
5 23 26  1,575.39 (3)   0.27 (19)  
To unveil the ties between countries in which counterparties are hosted, a new network was 
built that focuses in the country of each counterparty involved in a Portuguese OTC CDS 
Derivatives.  The process to build the first network was replicated but now focused on the 
countries of the counterparties active in the PT Products segment for the 28th December 2018. 
A few minor albeit necessary adaptations were done, as the country-country network will be 
focused on the country of the counterparty rather than the counterparty itself. For that purpose, 
we cross referenced the LEI code of the fields “Reporting Counterparty” and “Country of the 
other Counterparty” with the information in the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation 
(GLEIF) data base and used the country reported in the field” “Country of the other Counter-
party” for those cases where no match was found in GLEIF data set. 
Following the same process as in Subsection 4.2.1, the thickness of the links is proportional 
to the transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) – “Gross Notional” between the countries 
where the counterparties involved in the transaction are based on. Self-loops (transactions 
where both sides of the transaction had the same LEI code) were also excluded as it does not 
represent the same risk to the transaction chain. 
To facilitate the visual inspection of the network, and provide information with emphasis in 
the country, nodes have been replaced by the flags of the country they represent.  
The Figure 16 represents the country of each counterparty involved in a transaction of an 
OTC CDS identified with a Portuguese ISIN on the 28th December. As we saw in the country 
network of Subsection 4.2.1, and reported in other articles on CDS under EMIR, the hegemony 
of the United Kingdom (UK) is clear. This can be justified as the UK has been historically the 
“home market” for the OTC transactions of such sub-asset class. In this sense, it can be 
concluded that the PT Products segment network follows the tendency shown in (Abad et al., 
2016) and the statistical report published by the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(European Securities and Markets Authority, 2018b). The absence of Portuguese counterparties 
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in the counterparty to counterparty network is now confirmed as Portugal is not represented in 
the network below. 
 
Figure 16 – Undirected and unweighted network of gross notional amount, per country. Each of the 17 nodes 
represent a country involved in the PT Products segment, and the thickness of each of the 264 relationships 
(links) is proportional to the aggregated transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) between the counterparties 
of the countries (based on the cleaned data set of the 28th December 2018). 
Additionally, we provide in Table 10 the top 5 country of counterparties per centrality 
measure.  We observed that the influencer country, e.g., the country that if abandons the existing 
setting will have the most impact in the network is the United Kingdom - “UK”, followed by 
France - “FR” and the United States of America - “US”. The hegemony of UK is no news, 
considering that is has been the “home Market” for the OTC Derivatives Market in Europe, not 
only for the CDS. These three countries have the highest: (i) degree (highest number of links 
with other countries in the network), (ii) betweenness (serve as link between other countries in 
the network), and (iii) Eigenvector (high number of links with other countries well connected). 
Contrary to what we observed in the counterparty to counterparty network, the top 5 share the 
same level of centralities. 
Such predominance may be closely followed in light of the changes towards the approach 
of the UK concerning Europe and the impact that the to be concluded Brexit may have in the 
activity in this Market, where the top players and CCP are based in the UK. 
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Table 10 - Top 5 counterparties per Degree centrality and its placement regarding the other two centrality 
measures: betweenness and eigenvector (PT Products segment). The ranking is identified in brackets after the 
value. 
# Counterparty country Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
1 UK45 16  61.17 (1)   1 (1)  
2 FR46 14  44.67 (2)   0.91 (2)  
3 US47 7  7.17 (3)   0.61 (3)  
4 DE48 4  0 (4)   0.48 (4)  
5 KY49 4  0 (5)   0.48 (5)  
 
4.2.3 PT Participants segment (Portuguese counterparties active in the OTC 
CDS Derivatives Markets) 
In this Subsection we provide details of the network analysis for the data set focused on the 
Portuguese Participants, e.g., all Portuguese counterparties active in the OTC CDS Markets. 
For this purpose, we used the monthly data sets obtained at the end of Step 14 as described in 
Section 4.1, built only with transaction reports where at least one of the counterparties involved 
in such transaction is Portuguese. The network inference and characterisation was performed 
only for 28th December 2018. 
The network is extremely small and very sparse, containing only 15 counterparties (nodes), 
55 connections between them (links), and six components. Therefore, we will only highlight 
some of the metrics without running an exhaustive network metric analysis as we did in the 
previous Subsections. The dimension of the network can be justified mainly by two factors: (i) 
at least one of the counterparties of the transaction has to be Portuguese, and (ii) the level of 
specialisation associated to the CDS. The Portuguese financial market is small and went 
through a consolidation period post-crisis (Banco de Portugal (Eurosystem), 2018), which lead 
to a reduction in the number of entities with the capacity, willingness and the know how needed 
to participate in more complex Markets such as the OTC CDS Derivatives Markets. 
In the European landscape the main players in the OTC CDS are the G16, Banks and 
Financial Counterparties (FC), all of which the Portuguese counterparties (Banks and FC) 
interacted as it can be observed below in Figure 17. 
 
45 United Kingdom. 
46 France. 
47 United States of America. 
48 Germany. 
49 Cayman Islands. 
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On average, there were 19 active counterparties on the PT Participants segment network in 
the year of 2018. Being the month of December the one that registered the lowest number of 
active counterparties (15), and January April and May the highest (22).  
The diameter of the network, which represents the maximum shortest distance between two 
nodes in a network (number of links separating two nodes), in this case the longest path that a 
counterparty has to run to its furthest counterparty was constantly at two except in the months 
with the highest number of active counterparties (January, April and May): 4. 
Contrary to what we saw for the previous networks, the average degree decreased during the 
year of 2018, being December the month that registered the lowest value. This means that the 
number of counterparties for each participant active in the Market decrease during the year. 
Such increase was mostly due to some players leaving the market, in particular those from the 
G16 group. 
It is noteworthy that all transactions in the data set are not-cleared and therefore we will not 
observe the same level of activity from the Central Counterparties (CCPs) as for the previous 
networks, making the PT Participants segment network substantially different from the PT 
Products + PT Participants and PT Participants segment networks (Subsection 4.2.1 and 
Subsection 4.2.2, respectively).  
To perceive, the existing activity of the PT Participants segment under EMIR it was also 
drafted three graphic representation (Figure 17) using the data set from the 28th December 
2018.  
The construction process did not deviate from the ones executed priory (Subsection 4.2.1 
and Subsection 4.2.2) hence we added a link between two nodes (representing the relationship 
between the counterparties in a transaction) as long as at least one transaction on a CDS contract 
was observed between them. The size of the nodes is proportional to the transactions gross 
notional amount (in Euros) – ”Gross Notional”, whereas the thickness of the links is 
proportional to the transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) – ”Gross Notional” between 
the two counterparties. Self-loops (transactions where both sides of the transaction had the same 
Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) code were also excluded as it does not represent the same risk to 
the transaction chain. 
For all nodes to be visible, we used a scale as per the Figure 17 below. Additionally, 
counterparties are colored to highlight their types, following the same color pallet as before: (i) 
G16 in bright green; (ii) CCP in red; (iii) Banks in magenta; (iv) Funds in orange; (v) Financial 
Counterparties (FC) in blue; (vi) Non-Financial Counterparties (NFC) in black; (vii) 
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counterparties identified by the client code (CLC)50 in grey and (viii) in light blue the 
Portuguese players irrespectively of their counterparty type. 
The Figure 17 below shows a very different scenery from the previous networks, hence 
providing a good overview of some interesting features: the dominance of the Portuguese 
players that are present in all components of the network. 
The networks representing the PT Participants segment have six Portuguese players 
(belonging to the Bank and FC groups) of which five are part of each small component with 
only two nodes. The remaining Portuguese counterparty assumes a central role in the giant 
component, serving as the connection between the other four nodes (counterparties). 
 
 
Figure 17  – Undirected and unweighted network (PT Participants segment) of counterparty-counterparty 
of gross notional amount, highlighting the Portuguese counterparties within the network. The size of each of 
the 15 counterparties (nodes) is proportional to the transactions gross notional amount (in Euros), and the 
thickness of each of the 9 relationships (links) is proportional to the transactions gross notional. 
 
The Table 11 below provides a closer look to the top 5 counterparties per centrality measure, 
we observed that the most influence counterparty, e.g., a counterparty that if fails will have the 
most impact in the network is “0”. This counterparty has the highest: (i) degree (highest number 
of links with other counterparties in the network), (ii) betweenness (serve as link between other 
counterparties in the network), and (iii) Eigenvector (high number of links with other 
counterparties well connected).  
 
50 Possible only for the non-reporting counterparty – field 4 of the RTS 2017/104 & ITS 2017/105.  
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All counterparties in the top 5 per Degree centrality belong to the Bank, FC, and G16 group, 
and only one is Portuguese. 
 
Table 11 - Top 5 counterparties per Degree centrality and its placement regarding the other two centrality 
measures: betweenness and eigenvector (PT Participants segment). The place id identified in brackets after the 
value. 
# Counterparty ID Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
1 0 4 6 (1) 1 (1) 
2 9 1 0 (2) 0.50 (2) 
3 1 1 0 (3) 0.50 (3) 
4 2 1 0 (4) 0.50 (4) 
5 3 1 0 (5) 0.50 (5) 
 
To unveil the ties between countries in which counterparties are hosted, a new network was 
built that focuses in the country of each Portuguese counterparty involved in a transaction of a 
Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives.  The construction process executed for the first network 
was replicated from the same initial data set, dated of 28th December 2018. As performed in the 
previous Subsections, a few minor albeit necessary adaptations were done, as the country-
country network will be focused on the country of the counterparty rather than the counterparty 
itself. For that purpose, we cross referenced the LEI code of the fields “Reporting 
Counterparty” and “Country of the other Counterparty” with the information in the Global 
Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) data base and used the country reported in the 
field” “Country of the other Counterparty” for those cases where no match was found in 
GLEIF data set. 
Following the same process as above, the thickness of the links is proportional to the 
transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) – “Gross Notional” between the countries where 
the counterparties involved in the transaction are based on. Self-loops (transactions where both 
sides of the transaction had the same LEI code) were also excluded as it does not represent the 
same risk to the transaction chain. 
To facilitate the visual inspection of the network, we replaced nodes have by the flags of the 
country they represent.  
The Figure 18 represents the country of each counterparty involved in a transaction on an 
OTC CDS Derivative for the PT Participants segment network. As it may be seen, Portugal 
assumes a non-usual central role in the network while confirming the leading placement of the 
centrality metrics of the counterparty to counterparty network above. 
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Figure 18  – Undirected and unweighted network of gross notional amount, per country. Each of the 7 nodes 
represent a country involved in the PT Participants segment network, and the thickness of each of the 9 
relationships (links) is proportional to the aggregated transactions gross notional amount (in Euros) between the 
counterparties of the countries (based on the cleaned data set of the 28th December 2018). 
 
Additionally, we provide in Table 12 the country of counterparties per centrality measure.  
We observed that the influencer country, e.g., the country that if abandons the existing setting 
will have the most impact in the network is Portugal - “PT”, which is justifiable considering 
the restrictions made to reach the final data set: a Portuguese counterparty shall always be 
involved in the transaction otherwise would be excluded. Portugal has the highest: (i) degree 
(highest number of links with other countries in the network), (ii) betweenness (serve as link 
between other countries in the network), and (iii) Eigenvector (high number of links with other 
countries well connected).  
 
Table 12 - Top 5 counterparties per Degree centrality and its placement regarding the other two centrality 
measures: Betweenness and Eigenvector (PT Participants segment) The ranking is identified in brackets after 
the value. 
# Counterparty country Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
1 PT51 6  15 (1)   1 (1)  
2 IE52 1  0 (2)   0.41(2)  
3 UK53 1  0 (3)   0.41 (3)  
4 ES54 1  0 (4)   0.41 (4)  
5 FR55 1  0 (5)   0.41 (5)  
  
 
51 Portugal. 
52 Ireland. 
53 United Kingdom. 
54 Spain. 
55 France. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work we have analysed the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Markets from a 
network science perspective for the first time using the state report data set resulting from the 
transaction reporting obligation under European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) for 
the year of 2018.  
We followed the practices already detailed in the existing literature. However, we have used 
the derivative state report under EMIR for the year of 2018 (after the revision of the 
requirements that took place in November 2017). As far as we know, this is the first work to 
explore the data under the new revision guidelines at domestic (Portugal) scale. 
While our analysis suggests that so far, the data available is a breakthrough to understand 
the OTC CDS Derivatives activity in Europe, and show a strong potential to provide adequate 
improvements to supervision (measures, actions, controls, alerts), we also note the room for 
improvements regarding data quality. 
During our analysis, and since we focused on the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market, 
we performed a multi-segment analysis considering the following segments:  
(1) PT Product + PT Participants segment consisting of all reports where (i) at least one 
counterparty involved in the transaction is Portuguese; and (ii) non-Portuguese counterparties 
that entered into transactions in a CDS identified with a Portuguese International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN) code. It is noteworthy to mention that in this data set we focused 
only on the CDS single names and included counterparties identified with a Client Code (CLC); 
(2) PT Product segment consisting of all reports of transactions involving a Portuguese 
OTC CDS Derivative, e.g., a contract identified with a Portuguese ISIN, irrespectively of the 
country where the counterparty to the transaction was based on. To be noted that contrary to 
the previous data set, here we removed all reports where a counterparty was not identified with 
a valid LEI, e.g., excluding reports were the counterparty is identified by a CLC; and 
(3) PT Participants segment consisting of all reports where one of the counterparties 
involved is Portuguese. Similarly, to the decision taken for the data set focused on the PT 
Products segment, we removed all reports where a counterparty was not identified with a valid 
LEI. 
Despite the data quality issues found during the process, which are commonly acknowledge 
and reported in existing papers, articles and supervisors’ official communications (European 
Securities and Markets Authority, 2019b), it was possible to observe that the Portuguese OTC 
CDS Derivatives Market, for the first two aforementioned segments: PT Product + PT 
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Participants, and PT Products segment the main counterparties are the G16, the CCPs, and 
the banks, that serve as the links with the other counterparties within the networks, where the 
United Kingdom assumes the central mediating role in each of these country networks. Such 
results follow the same tendency as the overall European OTC CDS Derivatives Market, and 
can be observed by the results of the betweenness centrality of these players, which measures 
the potential control of a few central players over the other players in the network. In particular, 
as the betweenness highlights entities have that more often intermediate the flow of 
information/capital between other entities.  
The main difference between the PT Products + PT Participants segment, and PT 
Products segment is that the former exhibits more components (5, including the giant 
component), whereas the latter only shows one. The risk of failure of the central nodes in the 
PT Products + PT Participants segment is supplemented by those counterparties (nodes) 
belonging to the smaller components. We expect it to be less robust (not from the Central 
Counterparty (CCP), G16 or major Banks), and thus more sensitive to random failures. In the 
PT Products segment such risk is concentrated in the CCP, G16, and Banks as it is the case in 
other European (EU) level papers, thus we expect it to be more sensitive to target failures.  
In the PT Participants segment, we observed a completely different scenario with no 
presence from the CCP, being the risk assumed by the G16 or Banks, the latter in its majority 
Portuguese who serve as the link to smaller counterparties in the network. Similarly, to the 
previous segments, these entities are also the ones that present a higher betweenness and 
therefore are those that control the information/capital flows of the system. Which, in case of a 
failure poses additional risk to a system that highly relies on those central players. 
  To be noted that in the PT Products segment network we do not identify the presence of 
any Portuguese counterparties, whereas in PT Participants segment network they dominate, 
e.g. are active but in non-PT OTC CDS Derivatives. Therefore, we concluded that foreigners 
are the players in the PT Products segment network while Portuguese counterparties prefer 
cross-border (non-domestic) OTC CDS Derivatives Markets. 
Additionally, for each of the segments we performed an analysis of a meta-network, that 
aggregates data by country of the counterparties involved in the transactions on the OTC CDS 
Markets. For the PT Products + PT Participants segment, and PT Products segment, the 
United Kingdom (UK) assumes the leading role, with the highest betweenness centrality, which 
has also been reported in other available literature. Such leadership poses, in light of the recent 
shift in the UK towards Europe (EU) politics (Brexit), an additional concern to those already 
in place as the top players (in terms of access to other players in the network) are based in the 
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UK, and the main CCPs are also based in the UK. Hence the imminent Brexit may lead to 
regulatory arbitrage that could create disruption to the market with the loss of central players 
of the network, as well as unlevelled playing field. Such impact is real but still due to be 
assessed. On the contrary, the country network of the PT Participants segment is PT-center, 
where a Portuguese counterparty is involved even in the small components, always having a 
link with at least one Bank or a G16 player that has scale and procedures in place to offer 
services to smaller (less scaled) entities as those in the Portuguese financial system.  
These networks are resilient to random failures but largely susceptible to targeted failures of 
the few most central players in the network, which in case of failure can largely impair the 
function of the system and lead to the collapse of a large part of the network. 
From the analysis performed, we concluded that albeit some gains, there is still room for 
improvements in terms of data quality and reporting requirements. We believe that an effort 
should be made through the implementation of enforcement measures directly to the 
counterparties and the Trade Repositories (TRs) to subscribe to the necessary data quality 
standards required for this short analysis. Both are responsible for the existing data flaws, which 
are in breach with the European Regulation: EMIR. Furthermore, the activity(ies) that exist in 
these less opaque environments (OTC Derivatives Markets) and that could endanger the 
market, should be flagged for further investigation by the supervisors and policy makers. 
Overall, EMIR transaction reporting data is a useful and powerful tool that regulators in 
Europe should continue to use and continue to explore fields to improve and include into their 
daily and specific supervisory actions or plans. 
The modelling of such data allowed us to map the Portuguese OTC CDS Derivatives Market 
participants while identifying those that may be considered as a soft spot, e.g., those that present 
more of a risk as in case of failure are more susceptible to impact the network. 
We conclude this working paper with a brief mention to the Challenges and Limitations 
faced in the execution of this work, and an overview of Future Work opportunities following 
the methodology. 
 
5.1. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
Past works exploring EMIR data, but also  ESMA on its Supervision – 2018 Annual Report 
and 2019 Work Programme on Credit rating agencies, trade repositories, third country central 
counterparties, and third country central security depositories (European Securities and 
Markets Authority, 2019a), and most recently the final report on the peer review made to six 
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European competent authorities of the most significant derivatives markets in the European 
Union regarding the supervision made using the EMIR data (European Securities and Markets 
Authority, 2019c), recognise the effort being developed by the industry to improve the EMIR 
data quality. However, and more importantly, they also identified issues with the quality of 
existing data and the potential room for improvement in that respect. 
The EMIR reporting data sets available for the studied timeframe included: (i) daily 
transaction reporting that includes all changes to the transactions since they are open, up until 
their close, and (ii) state reports snap shots of the transactions in a specific date. Hence deciding 
which data set was best for the ensuing analysis that we report here, involved a tradeoff between 
the large volumes of daily raw data that contained all the information of each transaction (open 
or close of a position, modifications, cancelations) or rely on the state reports. The latter 
although a smaller data set (reduction of the data volume) only provide daily snap shots of the 
market and arguably introduce some information loss. 
Data quality and reporting issues faced during our study boiled down to three main reasons: 
i. Entity fault - counterparties to the transaction that misreported at least one field; 
ii. Trade Repositories fault - the first layer of data validation accepted reports with data 
flaws, shared them with ESMA, who then reshared it with the competent authorities 
alongside with accurate reports; and  
iii. Requirements (mandatory vs optional) fault – the optionality of some of the fields to be 
reported, should be revisited as some of those deem to have an important role in 
accessing the exposure and respective risk of each counterparty. 
We choose to work with the state report as it should be a snapshot of the market in a given 
day, and hooped it would reduce the data issues broadly reported. However, we still faced some 
inconsistencies that had a relevant impact in the cleaning process, caused delays, and posed 
challenges to an accurate mapping of the Portuguese OTC activity in CDS. Below a non-
exhaustive list of fields of the state report to which we considered there is room for reporting 
improvement and thus help in market supervision: 
• Maturity date, should not be allowed to be blank as an empty field misleads if the 
transaction should still be considered or has been terminated/closed; 
• There should be consistency between the field for the “ID of the other Counterparty56” 
and “Type of ID of the other Counterparty57” as mismatching happens (e.g. the first field 
 
56 Field 4 of ITS 2017/105. 
57 Field 3 of ITS 2017/105. 
72 
 
has a valid LEI whereas the other indicates that the counterparty is identified with a 
CLC); 
• Contract type, should be mandatory as its reporting may allow to cross reference for the 
clearing obligation as well as to adequately analyse the distinct products within each 
asset class; and 
• Rethink the reporting of baskets as a whole and the CDS in particular as with the existing 
free text field is not feasible to link the CDS baskets to a specific competent authority. 
 
5.2. FUTURE WORK 
Both 2019 and 2020 will be years of transformation in the EMIR landscape as (i) all industry 
players are  pushing for an improvement in the reporting data quality; (ii) the EMIR has just 
been revised (EMIR Refit58 or EMIR 2.2 (European Comission, 2019)); and (iii) the United 
Kingdom is negotiating an exit from the European Union (so called Brexit59). Hence, we 
foresee the potential benefits of further exploration and analysis of this data from a network 
perspective. 
At first glance, EMIR Refit will bring changes to the reporting obligations (e.g. introduction 
of a new type of counterparty – Small Financial Counterparties (SFC); removal of obligation 
to report transactions within the same group, national competent authorities may now decide 
what information to receive from the TRs, among others), and therefore a whole new potential 
for the EMIR transaction reporting data. 
Additionally, it may be equally interesting to widen the scope of the analysis: 
• Through the inclusion of the remaining asset classes subject to the EMIR: Interest Rate 
Derivatives (IRD); Foreign Exchange Derivatives (FX), Commodity Derivatives, and 
Equity Derivatives or any of its sub-asset classes; 
• By comparison with the full Portuguese Derivatives Market (e.g. include the 
transactions on Stock Exchanges);  
• Broaden the data by using the transactions report (daily files with all the transactions to 
be reported). 
We believe that further studies could take advantage of the methodology basics herewith but 
with a focus on the diversification of the analysis, either: 
 
58 Entry into force: 17 June 2019. 
59 There is still a lot of uncertainty regarding the date for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union as well as the terms 
of the agreement; or even if there will be an “exit agreement”. 
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• Event specific: like an analysis of the impact of Brexit in the Portuguese OTC 
Derivatives Market; 
• Regulation driven: considering the extensive range of European Regulations on 
different topics of the financial markets, this work may serve as a basis to seek a better 
understanding of other European or national data driven regulatory requirements. Or 
even to cross reference the transactions reported in compliance with different European 
Regulations (e.g. Stock Exchange Derivative transactions reported under the EMIR 
versus Stock Exchange Derivative transactions reported under the Market in Financial 
Instruments Regulation (MiFIR)); 
• Link current metrics used by supervisors to assess the risk of failure of different players 
with their position in the network in an attempt to detect ahead of time potential systemic 
problems to the financial system.  
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7. ANNEX 
7.1. LIST OF EXISTING TRADE REPOSITORIES (TR)60 
Table 13 – Trade repositories approved by ESMA per asset class and date 
Trade Repository Asset class Effective date 
DTCC Derivatives Repository Plc (DDRL, previously DTCC 
Derivatives Repository Ltd.) All asset classes 14 November 2013 
Krajowy Depozyt Papierów Wartosciowych S.A. (KDPW) All asset classes 14 November 2013 
Regis-TR S.A. All asset classes 14 November 2013 
UnaVista Limited All asset classes 14 November 2013 
CME Trade Repository Ltd. (CME TR) All asset classes 05 December 2013 
ICE Trade Vault Europe Ltd. (ICE TVEL) 
Commodities, credit, 
equities, interest 
rates 
05 December 2013 
Foreign exchange 04 June 2015 
NEX Abide Trade Repository AB All asset classes 24 November 2017 
DTCC Data Repository (Ireland) Plc All asset classes 1 March 2019 
UnaVista TRADEcho B.V. (The Netherlands) All asset classes 25 March 2019 
 
7.2. VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
The descriptions below were taken from the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2017/10461 of 19 October, supplementing EMIR: 
 
Table 14 – Variables selected from the original data set 
Field Description 
Reporting 
Counterparty ID Unique code identifying the reporting counterparty of the contract. 
ID of the other 
Counterparty 
Unique code identifying the other counterparty of the contract. This field shall be filled from 
the perspective of the reporting counterparty. In case of a private individual a client code shall 
be used in a consistent manner. 
Country of the 
other 
Counterparty 
The code of country where the registered office of the other counterparty is located or country 
of residence in case that the other counterparty is a natural person. 
Type of ID of the 
other 
Counterparty 
Type of the code to identify the other counterparty. 
Report submitting 
entity ID 
In the case where the reporting counterparty has delegated the submission of the report to a 
third party or to the other counterparty, this entity has to be identified in this field by a unique 
code. Otherwise this field shall be left blank. 
Clearing member 
ID 
In the case where the derivative contract is cleared and the reporting counterparty is not a 
clearing member itself, the clearing member through which the derivative contract is cleared 
shall be identified in this field by a unique code. 
 
60 https://www.esma.europa.eu/supervision/trade-repositories/list-registered-trade-repositories. 
61 (RTS 2017/104) with regards to regulatory technical standards on the minimum details of the data to be reported to trade 
repositories. 
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Beneficiary ID The party subject to the rights and obligations arising from the contract. Where the transaction 
is executed via a structure, such as a trust or fund, representing a number of beneficiaries, the 
beneficiary should be identified as that structure. Where the beneficiary of the contract is not 
a counterparty to this contract, the reporting counterparty has to identify this beneficiary by a 
unique code or, in case of a private individual, by a client code used in a consistent manner as 
assigned by the legal entity used by the private individual. 
Counterparty side Identifies whether the reporting counterparty is a buyer or a seller. 
Value of contract Mark to market valuation of the contract, or mark to model valuation where applicable under 
Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (EMIR). The CCP's valuation to be used for 
a cleared trade. 
Contract type Each reported contract shall be classified according to its type. 
Asset class Each reported contract shall be classified according to the asset class it is based on. 
Product 
identification type The type of relevant product identification. 
Product 
identification 
The product shall be identified through ISIN or AII62. AII shall be used if a product is traded 
in a trading venue classified as AII in the register published on ESMA's website and set up 
on the basis of information provided by competent authorities pursuant to Article 13(2) of 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006. AII shall only be used until the date of 
application of the delegated act adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 27(3) of 
Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (MiFIR). 
Underlying 
identification type The type of relevant underlying identifier. 
Underlying 
identification 
The direct underlying shall be identified by using a unique identification for this underlying 
based on its type. AII shall only be used until the date of application of the delegated act 
adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 27(3) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 
(MiFIR). For Credit Default Swaps, the ISIN of the reference obligation should be provided. 
In case of baskets composed, among others, of financial instruments traded in a trading venue, 
only financial instruments traded in a trading venue shall be specified. 
Trade ID Until global UTI is available, a Unique Trade ID agreed with the other counterparty. 
Venue of execution The venue of execution of the derivative contract shall be identified by a unique code for this 
venue. Where a contract was concluded OTC and the respective instrument is admitted to 
trading or traded on a trading venue, MIC code “XOFF” shall be used. Where a contract was 
concluded OTC and the respective instrument is not admitted to trading or traded on a trading 
venue, MIC code “XXXX” shall be used. 
Notional The reference amount from which contractual payments are determined. In case of partial 
terminations, amortisations and in case of contracts where the notional, due to the 
characteristics of the contract, varies over time, it shall reflect the remaining notional after the 
change took place. 
Execution 
timestamp Date and time when the contract was executed. 
Maturity date Original date of expiry of the reported contract. An early termination shall not be reported in 
this field. 
Confirmation 
timestamp 
Date and time of the confirmation, as set out in Article 12 of Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) N. º 149/2013. 
Cleared Indicates, whether clearing has taken place. 
CCP In the case of a contract that has been cleared, the unique code for the CCP that has cleared 
the contract. 
Intragroup Indicates whether the contract was entered into as an intragroup transaction, defined in Article 
3 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (EMIR). 
 
 
 
62 Alternative Instrument identifier - composed of six elements, and they collectively constitute the Alternative Instrument 
Identifier for an instrument. 
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Table 15 – Example of the variable’s outcome of the data set 
 
7.3. LEI STATUS 
 
Figure 19 - LEI status 
7.4. COMPLETE NETWORK – PT PRODUCTS + PT PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
 
Figure 20 - Undirected and unweighted network of counterparty-counterparty of gross notional amount 
(per degree centrality), highlighting the Portuguese counterparties within the network. The size of each of 
the 156 counterparties (nodes) is proportional to the transactions gross notional amount (in Euros), and the 
thickness of each of the relationships (links) is proportional to the transactions gross notional 
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